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INDEPENDENCE, BILL OF RIGHTS AND
CONSTITUTION ARE CONSISTENT
WITH ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE
IMAM FEISAL ABDUL RAUF1
In the first half of the twentieth century, the hitherto European concept
of “nation-state” with new national identities was introduced in much of the
world. With the end of the First World War in 1917 and of the Ottoman
Caliphate in 1924, new nation-states were created and emerged from the
previous Ottoman empire and its areas of influence: among these new na-
tion-states were Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia in the Arab
Middle East; and Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Albania in Europe.
Other new nation-states were born in South and South East Asia, drawn
around the boundaries of British and Dutch colonies (such as Malaysia and
Indonesia respectively) and the vestiges of the Mogul empire in India.
The rise of ethnic and language-based nation-states catalyzed the no-
tion of a religious nation-state—the idea of a Jewish and Islamic State hav-
ing been conceived in the late nineteenth century—resulting in the almost
simultaneous birth in 1947–1948 of the Islamic nation-state of Pakistan in
1. Founder and Chairman of the Cordoba Initiative. Liberally incorporating comments
from: MOHAMMED ARKOUN, RETHINKING ISLAM (Robert D. Lee trans., 1994); KHALED ABOU EL
FADL, ISLAM AND THE CHALLENGE OF DEMOCRACY (Joshua Cohen ed., 2004); Ebrahim Moosa,
The Poetics and Politics of Law After Empire, 1 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 1 (2002) [herein-
after Moosa, Poetics]; Ebrahim Moosa, The Dilemma of Islamic Rights Schemes, 15 J.L. & RELIG-
ION 185 (2001) [hereinafter Moosa, Dilemma]; FEISAL ABDUL RAUF, WHAT’S RIGHT WITH ISLAM
(2004); FEISAL ABDUL RAUF, ISLAM: A SACRED LAW (2000); ABDULAZIZ SACHEDINA, THE IS-
LAMIC ROOTS OF DEMOCRATIC PLURALISM (2001); and International Crisis Group, Understanding
Islamism, 2005 MIDDLE E./N. AFR. REP. 37.
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the Indian sub-continent, and of the Jewish nation-state of Israel in
Palestine.
Muslim political activists, not Muslim scholars and theologians, cre-
ated Pakistan. This late-nineteenth/early-twentieth century idea of “Islamic
State” originated as a reaction to powerful forces acting upon the Muslim
World. Among these forces were nationalist movements that divided the
notion of a pan-Islamic concept of the ummah (previously united by the
Ottoman Caliphate and therefore seen by many as a way to break up the
Muslim World); the colonial influence of Western Europe; and the new rise
of Soviet Communism—all of which sought to influence the Muslim World
away from its culture, norms, and beliefs.
In the post–World War II bipolar world, pressure was placed upon
many countries to align themselves with either the West or the Communist
bloc. In reaction, Muslim majority nations established in 1969 the Organi-
zation of the Islamic Conference, a fifty-seven-nation bloc that sought to
protect Islamic values.
In almost every one of these nations, Islamic political parties emerged
whose purpose was the establishment of an Islamic State. But what did this
mean? As these nations were majority Muslim, the term “Islamic State”
obviously meant something more. However, no consensus on the definition
of the term Islamic State exists.
To this end, therefore, I conceived of a project called the Sharia Index
Project.
Phase One of this project explored the degree of attainable consensus
among a broad spectrum of contemporary Muslim scholars (Sunni and
Shia) on defining the term Islamic State. The proposed understanding of
Islamic State is a state that abides by a list of Islamic Law (Sharia)–based
criteria that it should protect, provide for, and further. Phase One involved
research by scholars, followed by discussion and refinement.2
In Phase Two, a methodology was developed to qualitatively and
quantitatively gauge countries (Muslim and non-Muslim majority States) on
how well they have actually fulfilled and met each of these criteria, and
thereby determine which institutional systems have currently achieved the
most in furthering the set of criteria established in Phase One. The Cordoba
Initiative had discussions with Zogby International, Gallup, Pew, and
others, to explore how to develop a methodology to measure and index
other nations according to their level of compliance with Sharia.3
2. I have convened six meetings in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, of such a group of scholars
from Morocco to Indonesia, from 2006–2009 wherein a working definition of an Islamic State
was benchmarked.
3. Among the possibilities is to conduct a poll where citizens are asked to rate their own
country on how well it meets each of the criteria Islamic jurists will have established in Phase
One. Thus, while the role of the Islamic jurists will be to list the principles and rights an Islamic
State should safeguard, citizens themselves would rate their own countries on how well their own
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The blend of Phase One results, namely providing an ends-driven defi-
nition of an Islamic State to counterpoise and complement institution-driven
definitions, combined with the data from Phase Two, namely measurable
data on which countries achieved the highest scores in Sharia-compliance,
will contribute to the continuing scholarly debate on what comprises “Is-
lamically authentic” institutional forms and criteria of governance. The
Sharia’s emphasis on social justice and safety nets for the poor may well
result in certain non-Muslim majority nations scoring higher on these line
items than certain Muslim majority nations.
By establishing a methodology that demonstrates which states have
maximally succeeded on the ground in establishing “Islamic ends,” the
Sharia Index Project hopes to shift the discourse away from a demographic-
or institution-based definition of an Islamic state to showing which institu-
tional forms have best succeeded in achieving said ends and why. Byprod-
ucts of this will be detailing the points of similarity and difference between
Western and Islamic understandings of law and justice and improving the
nature of the discourse on Sharia between the West and the Muslim world.
In this paper, where my intent is to show how the American Declara-
tion of Independence, Bill of Rights, and Constitution are consistent with
Islamic jurisprudence, I shall first have to tell the reader the story of:
• The objectives of the Sharia Index Project, the rationale for rating
nations according to Sharia compliancy, the coherence of the term
Islamic State, recent trends in shifting from an institutional- to an
ends-based definition of the term Islamic State, and some terms that
have been used to differentiate non-Islamic States from Islamic
States;
• Challenges in developing a coherent theory of Sharia compliance on
governance. This includes the issue of political power and how those
holding political power have shaped the discourse on the subject, the
concept of human rights and comparing the rise of human rights in
recent Western discourse to the Islamic concept of human rights;
• How an Islamic human rights doctrine might be established; and
• How the American Declaration of Independence, Constitution, and
Bill of Rights are consistent with Islamic jurisprudential thought.
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governments meet these standards. This takes the burden of grading off the shoulders of the schol-
ars and makes it as objective as possible.
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I. INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL REMARKS
A. Objectives of the Sharia Index Project
Among the objectives of this project are:
1. To inform the public both in the Muslim world and in the West—
especially decision makers in the United States and abroad—and
clarify their understanding on the nuances of what an “Islamic
State” substantively means.
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2. To decouple the nomenclature “Islamic State” from a demographic
definition and anchor it to one based on criteria of governance.
3. To posit and test the possibility of establishing a broad consensus
on an ends-driven definition of Islamic governance, and to differen-
tiate that from an institution-driven definition.
4. To clarify the relationships between institutions of religion and of
political power according to Islamic law.
5. To make the discourse on “religious” versus “secular” states more
sober and dispassionate, and to delineate and nuance differences
and overlaps.
6. To provide Muslim societies with an informed and objective basis
on how they define and grade themselves as “Islamic,” and how
they might improve themselves on that scale.
7. To reduce Western nations’ fear of “Islamic States.” We believe
that United States policy vis-a`-vis Muslim nations would be well
served, and more coherent, if it revealed a nuanced understanding
of the role of religion, especially Islam, in Muslim societies. The
United States has historically had intimate relations with pivotally
oil-important Saudi Arabia and Gulf countries, is engaged in critical
negotiations with Iran on its nuclear aspirations and support of
Hizbollah, and has sought to broker relations between its nuclear
ally Pakistan and its nuclear neighbor India (and other geopoliti-
cally important neighbors). The United States is, moreover, sup-
porting democratic aspirations in Egypt, and involved with
Turkey’s desire to enter the European Union (“E.U.”), despite con-
comitant European angst about allowing an Islamic country to be
part of Europe—not to mention European perplexity on how to deal
with its Islamic immigrant and second-generation communities.
The United States is involved in nation-building in Iraq, Af-
ghanistan, and indirectly in Palestine. In all of these areas, we sug-
gest that an understanding of the role of religion—and especially
Islam—and its intersections with politics and policies, is vital. This
project aims to make an important contribution in shedding light,
and reducing the heat, on this important subject.
8. In discussions with scholars of other religions, this project may cat-
alyze similar analyses on what a “Jewish,” “Christian,” or “Hindu”
state might look like. (The sense of many was that they may not be
that different in the ethical sense.)
B. Is There a Rationale for a Sharia-Compliant Rating of States?
The Qur’anic rationale for rating nations is provided by Qur’an 3:110,
which asserts to the Prophet’s companions, “You are the best community
[khayra ummah or nation] raised from humankind: you enjoin the good [or
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the right] and forbid evil and believe in God.”4 Muslim scholars point out
that God calls the Prophet’s companions the “best community” not merely
because they were the Prophet’s companions and practiced the liturgy and
the Prophet’s rituals of worship (the class of actions called ‘ibadat). Rather,
they were the “best community” because they were his companions in
partnering with the Prophetic impulse to uphold and proactively implement
the principles of enjoining the right, forbidding the wrong, and believing in
God. If they only believed in God, but neither enjoined right nor forbade
wrong, this would not have sufficed to qualify them as the “best
community.”5
University of Virginia Professor Abdulaziz Sachedina adds that this
verse “is constitutive of God’s purpose of creating an ethical order responsi-
ble for ‘commanding the good and forbidding the evil,’ and does not con-
nect the status of being the best with a self-righteous presumption of the
need to convert others; rather, it ascribes the status of the best to a commu-
nity charged with the responsibility of instituting good and preventing
evil.”6 This verse is just as concerned with the ethical norms of man-man
relations as it is with enhancing man-God relations. Four verses later, the
Qur’an nuances this point: “Of the People of the Book [Jews and Chris-
tians] there is an upright community [ummah] who . . . believe in God and
the Last Day, enjoin the good and forbid evil and vie with one another in
good deeds.”7
This Qur’anic text arguably provides Muslims with some Divine crite-
ria on how to determine the “best community or nation.” It also suggests
that among Jews and Christians there are communities that meet these crite-
ria; thus, it is possible for followers of the Prophet Muhammad’s form of
worship to slip away from the “best nation” position and lose it to commu-
nities that, while not formally “Islamic,” are technically so by virtue of
fulfilling this verse’s requirements. This can happen because it is possible
to score well in one or more of the above four categories and poorly in
others. For example, a community may believe in God while at the same
time neither enjoining the good nor forbidding evil, and find massive social
wrongdoing its norm, vying with each other in evil deeds.
Moreover, the Divine imperative in 3:114, and repeated in several
other Qur’anic instances,8 implicitly suggests competition, and thus the ex-
4. QUR’AN 3:110.
5. QUR’AN 48–54 differentiates between mere “submitters” (muslim), “believers” (mu’mins)
and in the well-known hadith of Gabriel, “doers of good” (muhsins), thus establishing at an indi-
vidual level grades of religious accomplishment. Other verses, such as 3, mention, among degrees
of striving laysu sawaa’a and those who go out in jihad are a‘zamu darajatan min alladhina
qa‘aduu. Thus grading both between good and bad, and between the good and the better is part of
the Qur’anic worldview and supported by ahadith that speak of grades of heaven and of hell.
6. SACHEDINA, supra note 1, at 135.
7. QUR’AN 3:113–14 (emphasis added).
8. See QUR’AN 21:90, 23:61.
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istence of a rating. Some textual examples are: “compete with one another
in good works”9—a command addressed to those with different goals, not
only to Muslims but to members of other religions—and “race [one an-
other] towards forgiveness from your Lord and a heaven whose extent is
that of the heaven and earth.”10 Competition and racing toward a set of
Divine rewards clearly implies the existence of a Divine scorecard. The
Sharia Index Project seeks to explore and probe how to establish this score-
card from an Islamic jurisprudential point of view.
C. The Term “Islamic State” (dawla islamiyya)
A review of the semantic uses of the term “Islamic State”11 in the
media, in common parlance, and in literature on the subject shows that this
9. See QUR’AN 3:113–14 (emphasis added). QUR’AN 2:148 reads: “To each is a goal to
which God turns him; then strive together (as in a race) towards all that is good.” QUR’AN 5:51
reads: “For every one of you [Jews, Christians, Muslims] We have appointed a law and a way.
Had God willed, He would have made you one community; but that [He has not done in order
that] He may try you in what has come to you.” Sachedina argues that this verse also entails a
Divine imperative for religious pluralism, and “can serve to overcome discrimination based on
exclusive religious claims and entitlements and can provide humankind the vision of a global
community bound together to achieve the common good for all citizens of the world.”
SACHEDINA, supra note 1, at 134; see also id. at 63.
10. QUR’AN 57:21 (emphasis added).
11. Before we proceed in our discussion of an Islamic State, an important observation needs
to be made on the nomenclature “Islamic” and its semantic uses in the general and juridical
aspects.
(a) The term “Islamic” has been generally used—especially by non-Muslims as well as in-
creasingly by Muslims—to signify all that Muslims do, or that is of Muslims, so much that terms
like “Islamic Civilization,” “Islamic Studies,” “Islamic art,” “Islamic food,” “Islamic architec-
ture,” “Islamic literature,” “Islamic history,” and more recently “Islamic fundamentalism,” “Is-
lamism,” “Islamic terrorism,” and thus including our subject “Islamic State,” are terms often used
to signify entities and activities that are not always logically or popularly regarded as religious in
either the Muslim or non-Muslim ways of looking at things, and which in fact are more accurately
secular, un-Islamic or even anti-Islamic, or explicable in terms of local customs unrelated to Is-
lam. While many of these activities would not generally be labeled “Christian,” “Buddhist,” or
described by a religious adjective in other religious traditions and contexts, Muslims have bought
into this nomenclature, which has in some contexts created a self-fulfilling prophecy and a vicious
and occasionally pernicious cycle of wanting to “Islamize” that which cannot coherently be “Is-
lamized.” Generally people assume that Islamic in this context means that it is in accordance with
Islamic theology or law, i.e., “Sharia-compliant,” or even required by it.
(b) “Islamic law” approximates the above use in the field of law; it includes the sum total of
“what Muslims juridically did.” Juridically, the term “Islamic” is also often used in common
parlance to mean “approved by, consistent with, or required by Islamic law.” It is necessary to
bear in mind, while all of Qur’anic law is Islamic, not all of Islamic law is Qur’anic. Islamic law is
used to describe more than just Qur’anic laws and ordinances and those from the Sunnah. It
therefore includes the legal writings, opinions, precedents, judgments, rulings and growing body
of consensus among jurists, and the legislation of succeeding rulers after the death of the Prophet
Muhammad. It also includes pre-Islamic customs and laws which are not inconsistent with
Qur’anic and Hadith injunctions that populations continued to practice once they became liturgi-
cally Muslim; this happened because Islamic jurists regarded custom (‘adah or ‘urf) as a subsidi-
ary source of law when not in conflict with Qur’an or Sunnah.
Where matters are made more complex to the lay Muslim—Muslim jurists agreed that cer-
tain differences of opinion are deemed equally valid, thus “equally Islamic,” which led to the rise
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term is used in two senses: one is demographic (meaning a state with a
majority population practicing the faith of Islam), the second is vis-a`-vis
governance (generally understood to mean a state governed by Sharia Law).
While most Islamic legal scholars will agree with the second sense in prin-
ciple, a wide divergence of opinion exists on how this should be practically
accomplished, let alone best accomplished.
This should not be surprising, for the question of how to accomplish a
state governed by Sharia law has historically cleaved the Islamic commu-
nity, and eventually split Islam into the Sunni and Shia sects. This was the
question that gave rise to the Kharijis, who after first having followed the
fourth Caliph Ali, seceded from him—one of whom eventually assassinated
him—because they believed he was not vigorous enough in his campaign
against Muawiyah.12 Passions became so aroused in response to this ques-
tion that it was politically difficult and dangerous for some to make their
opinions public. Many people felt it would be safer to “punt” and defer the
question to God, who would decide this question in the hereafter—those
holding this position becoming known as the “deferrers”—the murji’a. It is
not surprising, therefore, that various views of rule and theories on the Cali-
phate arose, nor should it be surprising that this question continues to pas-
sionately divide contemporary Islamic scholars and lay Muslims.
In the early days of Islamic history, the focus of the question was
about how to ensure right governance. The Shia position centered on who
had the inherent right to rule, i.e., the inherent legitimacy of the ruler. The
assumption was that the right “who” would rule in accordance with divine
ordinances; in other words, the right “who” would guarantee rule by
Sharia.13 Their opposition to the Umayyad, and later the Abbasid autocratic
monarchies that clung to power, were about placing the right “who” in a
position of power. The political power of autocratic monarchs forced the
Sunni juristic tradition to evolve to a position that accepted the ruler’s legit-
imacy as long as he ruled in accordance with divine ordinances, i.e., the
Shariah, even if he obtained the power to rule illegitimately.
of five major schools of law between the Sunni and Shia, and a few minor ones. The non-special-
ist is rarely able to discern when a difference of opinion among contemporary scholars lies within
the boundary of “differences of legal opinion equally Islamically valid” and when a position is
“outside the pale of what is Islamically valid,” even in the domain of matters of worship that have
been established centuries ago. The poor lay reader is therefore completely lost when reading the
writings of modern Islamic legal scholars and watching their sometimes passionate disagreements
on the subject of an Islamic state; as to whether these are differences within the domain of what is
Islamically valid, or whether one position is beyond the pale “Islamically speaking,” notwith-
standing the accusation of one scholar that the other indeed is Islamically “off the wall.” We
therefore urge Muslim jurists—for the sake of the ummah—to help the lay Muslim delineate this
boundary.
12. Muawiyah was the governor of Damascus who challenged the fourth Caliph Ali (the
Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law) upon the death of the third Caliph Uthman, until which time the
Caliphate’s capital was based in Medina.
13. This gave rise to the Shia theory of the Imamate, the Righteous Imams.
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Spanning the history of the Muslim peoples until the contemporary
scene, what governance by Sharia law means—or ought to mean—in prac-
tice, is and has been somewhat unclear. It has been interpreted institution-
ally in a variety of ways:
• A state governed by descendants of the Prophet.14
• A state ruled by Muslim theologians (more accurately jurists,
faqihs)—what we may call in English a theocracy (more accurately
a “jurist-ocracy,” implying thereby and establishing the means of the
rule of law).15
• A state that is governed along the lines of the historical political
theory and practice of Muslim rulers. This has been interpreted in a
number of ways—most see in historical precedent a “Caliphate,”
whereas others see a democracy.
• A state that is liberal and democratic. The argument given by expo-
nents of democracy is based less on democratic institutional forms as
part of Islamic historical precedent, than it is based on the argument
that it provides the best chances of achieving the justice and human
dignity that the Prophet and his closest companions sought to
preserve.
The historical political theory approach begins chronologically by ana-
lyzing the Prophet’s “Medina Constitution,” which was established between
the Prophet and his followers on his emigration from Mecca with the Jew-
ish tribes and Arab polytheist tribes of Medina. Next it layers the precedents
of the Orthodox Caliphs onto the ideal of rule by a “Successor to the
Prophet” (Caliph). It draws from these historical formulations to develop
either a theory of Caliphal rule, or alternately a theory of what would grant
legitimacy to such rule.
Parallel and adjacent to the political theory approach is the juridical
approach that examines and emphasizes the collective writings of Islamic
jurists over the past fourteen centuries regarding this subject. In light of the
precedent of the Prophet and the Orthodox Caliphs, many of these jurists
worked to build a counterculture—an “opposition party”—to the court cul-
ture of many Caliphs and protest movements that sought to “transform the
corrupt political order of their day and make it submit to [what they recog-
14. This is the historical Shia position, further nuanced by a definition that means rule by the
descendants of Husayn son of Ali. We note that a Sharifian (Prophet’s descendants) dynasty of
rule prevailed in the Maghrib (i.e., the area of Morocco) that was descended through the line of
Hasan, son of Ali; but this latter was not considered Shia in the jurisprudential sense because they
followed one of the Sunni schools of jurisprudence (Maliki). We also note that the modern Islamic
Republic of Iran, a Shia State, has had Rafsanjani, a non-descendant of the Prophet as their head
of State. Therefore, the original political intent of the Shia impulse has been overtaken and “dis-
solved” by the on-the-ground political reality. See infra note 15.
15. It is interesting that Ayatollah Khomeini established in Shia Iran the notion of vilayeti-
faqih, rule by the jurisprudent, a notion that arguably sidesteps rule by descendants of the Prophet,
and brings this a big step closer to the Sunni model.
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nized as being in accord with] God’s will.”16 Such studies attempt to extract
from these precedents principles that may be considered “Islamic,” since
they flow out of the Prophet’s own normative practice (Sunnah) and of his
closest companions. These companions, by consensus of Islamic scholarly
opinion, understood the importance of the Qur’an and the Sunnah better
than any future generations.17
Lay readers are bound to be confounded by the strong disagreement
existing among scholars concerning which hermeneutic, or approach to
their identical conclusions, is superior, even among those who believe in the
same institutional forms. If the end result is the same, why quibble, let
alone have heated arguments about how we get there?18
D. Is an Islamic State a Coherent Idea?
Some argue that the notion of an “Islamic State” is incoherent, even
illegitimate, because it stands in opposition to the more rigorous and funda-
mental idea of the ummah—the supra-national community of believers,19
and because the modern nation-state did not flow out of traditional Islamic
institutional norms.20 In spite of this being the intuitive sense of most Mus-
16. RAUF, WHAT’S RIGHT WITH ISLAM, supra note 1, at 188 (quoting KAREN ARMSTRONG,
ISLAM: A SHORT HISTORY 46 (2000)).
17. What complicates the historical approach is that it is possible to find precedents for a
range of possibilities. Since 656 CE, Muslims were ruled by dynastic and often autocratic monar-
chies—even though the rulers called themselves “Caliphs”—until the Ottoman Caliphate which
ended in 1924. And just as it was possible to have atheistic fascism (e.g., the Soviet Union) and
atheistic liberal democratic societies (e.g., France); Christian fascist societies and Christian liberal
democratic societies; we believe it is possible to provide an Islamic veneer to any form of govern-
ment. It is therefore possible, in our opinion, to create an “Islamic” fascist society, an “Islamic”
autocracy, an “Islamic” meritocracy, an “Islamic” monarchy, an “Islamic” republic, and an “Is-
lamic” liberal or illiberal democracy. For just as there are always lawyers who argue opposite
sides of a case before the Supreme Court of the United States, each side sincerely believing its
position is constitutional (a situation generally possible within any system of jurisprudence) it is
and has always been possible for any government to find Islamic jurists who would argue for the
Sharia-compliancy of one form of institutional governance over another. During the Nasser re-
gime in the 1960s, books were written on how socialism flowed from Islamic thought and ideals.
18. In the United States, for example, while Muqtedar Khan and Khaled Abou El Fadl both
believe in democracy as the best institutional form, Khan argues that the Medina Constitution
establishes the institutional precedent for an Islamic democratic polity. El Fadl passionately dis-
agrees with Khan and argues that a juridical and theological approach provides a more “Islami-
cally authentic” basis and argument for democracy. EL FADL, supra note 1, at 66; see also, id. at
112–15. The latter approach is the hermeneutic used by Abdulaziz Sachedina in arguing from
Qur’anic texts for a democratic pluralism rooted in Islamic texts and jurisprudence. SACHEDINA,
supra note 1.
19. International Crisis Group, supra note 1, at 6.
20. The Indian Muslim thinker Abu’l Ala al-Mawdudi was opposed to the Muslim national-
ism of Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, arguing that nationalism implied sovereignty of the
people, whereas the true Islamic State was founded on the principle that sovereignty belongs to
God (al-hakimiyya li-llah). In contextualizing Mawdudi’s thoughts, we note that he was opposed
to the adoration (al-‘ubudiyya) of political leaders and parties in God’s place that dominated polit-
ical thought in the first half of the twentieth century, and that he viewed religious nationalism
within the construct of a nation-state as a vehicle for, if not in itself a new form of, jahiliyya.
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lims, Islamic political parties in much of the Muslim world have accepted
the nation-state as their primary framework. Thus, they have de facto legiti-
mized the idea of the nation-state, and defined the term Islamic State [dawla
islamiyya] to mean a nation-state where “governance is according to the
principles of Sharia.” Jurists, therefore, must respond to this on-the-ground
reality; either they must condemn the “Islamic nation-state” as an invalid
concept under Islamic law (as the Indian Muslim thinker Abu’l Ala al-
Mawdudi felt), or they must find a way to give the phrase “Islamic State” a
coherent definition within an ummah-wide framework. For the sake of both
Muslim and non-Muslim communities, they need to do this as rapidly as
possible—to find a way to generate the broadest consensus possible across
the spectrum of intra-Islamic sectarian jurists on points of agreement, and
amplify that message.21
It should also be noted that Islamic political movements are shifting
away from a definite institutional conception of “the Islamic State” that is
contrasted with existing states in the Muslim world and promoted at the
latter’s expense. Indeed, Islamic political movements have begun to ac-
knowledge that scriptural texts (the Qur’an, the sunna, and the hadith) do
not contain a clear definition of the “Islamic State” and hence it can, ac-
cordingly, take different institutional forms. At the same time, recognition
of the scriptural limitations in this respect has led these movements to drop
the simplistic slogans, such as “al-Islam huwa al-hall” (“Islam is the solu-
tion”) and “al-Qur’aˆn dusturna” (“the Qur’an is our Constitution”), which
they previously favored. The movements also dissociate themselves from
the conceptions of fundamentalist Islamic movements inclined to invoke the
original Islamic community of first century AH/seventh century CE Arabia
as the political model to emulate.
This occurs, in part, because these slogans need to be examined in the
context of nation-building, and also because of the diversity of Islamic ac-
tivist political forms in the current Muslim world. For example, in Saudi
Arabia, there is a strong partnership between a monarchy and a clergy; in
the Islamic Republic of Iran, a theocratic rule of the jurisprudent (vilayeti-
faqih) prevails; in Jordan, the Islamic Action Front (the party established by
the Jordanian Muslim Brothers) has accepted and even defended the
Hashemite monarchy as legitimate in Islamic terms; in Morocco, the Justice
Comparing this to Jack Donnelly’s presentation of three models of international human rights,
Mawdudi, and Muslims generally, believe more deeply in what Donnelly posits as the “cosmopol-
itan” model which starts with individuals as part of a truly global community (the ummah), and
who therefore regard states as “the problem.” JACK DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
28 (1998).
21. For example, if as mentioned above El Fadl and Khan agree that a democracy is the best
institutional form from an “Islamic point of view” but passionately disagree on how they arrive at
that decision, the former conclusion (their point of agreement) ought to be amplified more than the
latter point (namely how they arrived at that conclusion) for the benefit of positive political reform
in the Muslim world.
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and Development Party (PJD) has similarly made its “royalist” credentials
very clear in proclaiming its recognition of the king’s status as “the com-
mander of the faithful” (amir al-mu’minin); in “republican” Egypt, mean-
while, the Muslim Brothers have endorsed the Islamic credentials not only
of the state but also of the government, and in Turkey the Justice and De-
velopment Party (AKP), currently in government, has similarly made clear
its acceptance (and thus in effect its endorsement) of both the secularist and
the republican aspects of the Kemalist constitution.22 In ethnically pluralist
Malaysia, where ethnic Malays are constitutionally Muslim and the United
Malay National Organization (UMNO) runs the government, former Prime
Minister Abdullah Badawi (2003–2009) ran and won election by the widest
historical margin on a platform of “Progressive (or Civilizational) Islam”
(Islam hadari). Not surprisingly, American and Western Muslim legal
scholars have generally preferred and argued in favor of a democratic
polity.
E. Twentieth-Century Political Dynamics in the West
In the West, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were marked by the
rise of an anti-religious secular humanism that ejected religiosity from the
hallways and boardrooms of power. This coincided with the rise of Com-
munism and its socialist ideas in Russia and Eastern Europe—ideas that
were resonant in the United States through the depression era, and which
furthered the antipathy to religion in Europe and populous regions of the
Far East, which came under the influence of Communism and Socialism,
such as in China and India respectively. While anti-religiosity was more
widespread in Europe than in the United States, Europe exerted a strong
intellectual influence upon American intelligentsia, and European colonial-
ism exerted powerful political influence upon the Muslim world and its
intelligentsia. This secularism affected the religious interpretations of laws
in American courts, and influenced the development of ideologies in the
Muslim world.
From the second half of the nineteenth century through the first half of
the twentieth century, Muslims desired—and attempted—to establish Is-
lamic democratic regimes.23 The geopolitical realities of the twentieth cen-
tury, namely the remnants of colonial military power succeeded by the Cold
War calculus, prevented this from happening. Instead, authoritarian regimes
arose in the major intellectual capitals of the Islamic world: particularly in
Egypt, Turkey, and Iran. These historically multi-cultural and multi-relig-
ious societies were increasingly replaced by ethnic and religious national-
22. International Crisis Group, supra note 1, at 6.
23. The Wafd party in Egypt attempted to establish a nascent democratic polity, and had on
its platform Egyptian Muslims, Copts, and Jews, expressing the religious diversity and multi-
religious demographic of Egypt.
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isms, such as Turkish and Arab, and Islamic nationalism (most notably in
the establishment of Pakistan). The most influential of these regimes either
abolished or gutted political opposition parties and furthered a militant anti-
religious secularism that spawned a militant fundamentalist reaction. West-
ern powers tolerated regimes when they abused their own peoples’ human
rights, leading many Muslims to believe that the West wanted to humiliate,
subjugate, and oppress the Muslim world, and that it was unconcerned with
human rights abuses conducted by regimes friendly to the West.24
Europe also underwent changes in the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury. From 1914 through 1945, the technological advances in warfare and
new post-Industrial Revolution socio-economic disruptions in human rela-
tions precipitated the First World War. A decade later, a lengthy economic
depression caused starvation and human suffering on a historically unprece-
dented scale. Then, Europe suffered in the Second World War from the loss
of civilian and military human life of unprecedented magnitude, genocide
of Jews, gypsies, and others deemed racially impure by the fascist Nazi
regime (the Holocaust), and from the invention of weapons of mass destruc-
tion capable of destroying the whole human race.
World War II destroyed the European powers, and birthed two global
superpowers: the United States and Soviet Union—both seeking to prosely-
tize their notions of societal constructs upon the whole world. Believing in
the superiority of their worldviews, they cooperated in some areas, and dis-
agreed in others. They shared an egalitarian and secular worldview, and, not
wanting to see the world self-destruct, established the United Nations
(U.N.) from the ashes of the League of Nations. The United Nations’ first
task was to establish its Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),25
24. This belief is sustained by the human rights abuses conducted in Guantanamo, Abu
Ghraib in Iraq, and Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan.
25. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was prepared by the Commission on Human
Rights of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the United Nations. Eleanor Roosevelt,
widow of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, niece of Theodore Roosevelt, and social activist,
chaired the commission. We observe a resonance with her late husband’s “Four Freedoms Ad-
dress” he delivered in his annual message to Congress on January 6, 1941. Clearly inspired by the
ideas and idealism of Wilson’s New Freedom and Teddy Roosevelt’s Square Deal, Roosevelt
declared, “Just as our national policy in internal affairs has been based upon a decent respect for
the rights and the dignity of all our fellowmen within our gates, so our national policy in foreign
affairs has been based on a decent respect for the rights and dignity of all nations, large and
small.” Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1941 State of the Union Address: Four Freedoms Address (Jan. 6,
1941). In it he identified the four basic freedoms as follows:
• Freedom of speech and expression—everywhere in the world.
• Freedom of every person to worship God in his own way—everywhere in the world.
• Freedom from want, which, translated into world terms, means economic understandings
that will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants—everywhere in
the world.
• Freedom from fear, which, translated into world terms, means a worldwide reduction of
armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a
position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor—everywhere in the
world.
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declared to both legitimize the United Nations26 and to prevent the horrors
and abuses that a generation of Europeans had suffered through. The com-
bined political influence of the United States and the Soviet Union rapidly
eroded the historical division of humanity into social classes of royal, noble,
mercantile, feudal, and serf. Paradoxically, the then European colonies uti-
lized the UDHR, both within the framework of the United Nations and
without, to agitate for political independence and freedom from their colo-
nial masters. Thus, a Western secular human rights doctrine resulted, which
maintained the ethical dimensions of the Abrahamic religious doctrine, but
completely divested it of any metaphysical attachment to its religious ori-
gins. Human rights emanating from this viewpoint were deemed “univer-
sal” and “inalienable” just because people are human.
Egalitarian doctrines took root and gained force even in far eastern
societies whose traditional religious and societal doctrines embraced une-
qual classes of human beings (such as India and Japan where a caste system
regarded the lowest caste levels of human life as dispensable). It is remarka-
ble that secular humanists and atheist communists have succeeded in mak-
ing a religion out of the Abrahamic Ethic’s second commandment (to love
your fellow humans), absent the first commandment (to love God), and that
they have been able to globalize this “religion” via international political
activity.
The Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights (UIDHR) of 1981
parallels the UDHR in that it was made in reaction to the abuses Muslim
populations underwent. In its own words, “It is unfortunate that human
rights are being trampled upon with impunity in many countries of the
world, including some Muslim countries.”27 Unlike (as we shall detail be-
low) the American Declaration of Independence, the UIDHR did not—and
could not—address the issue of governmental power, any more than to re-
mind governments ruling over Muslim populations to fulfill their duties to
their populations and aver that “human rights in Islam are an integral part of
the overall Islamic order and it is obligatory on all Muslim governments
and organs of society to implement them in letter and in spirit within the
framework of that order.”28
The end of the Cold War in 1989 created a new global geopolitical
landscape, but the need for a revision of Western policies towards the Is-
lamic world was not felt until 9/11. Even the Iranian revolution in 1979
against the Shah and the rise of Islamic militancy in much of the Muslim
world targeted against their own regimes did little to make Western policy-
26. Marnia Lazreg, Human Rights, State and Ideology: An Historical Perspective, in HUMAN
RIGHTS: CULTURAL AND IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 37–39 (Adamantia Pollis & Peter Schwab
eds., 1979).
27. Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights, Foreward, para. 4.
28. Id. at para. 3.
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makers aware of their need to address the issues of concern to the Islamic
masses.
F. Modern Trends in Shifting from an Institutional Definition to an
Ends Definition that Describes Muslim Aspirations
In order to create political space for themselves, contemporary Islamic
political movements have explicitly broken away from fundamentalist per-
spectives. Abandoning the revolutionary utopian project of dawla islamiyya
in the strictly institutional sense has led them to emphasize other themes—
what I call “ends”—most notably the demand for justice (al-’adala) and
freedom (al-hurriyya). In articulating these demands, these movements
have insisted that the key to their realization is the consecration by the state
of Islamic law, the Sharia. This reliance on Sharia, however, while remain-
ing a central feature of Islamist political agendas and rhetoric, is itself now
qualified by two key elements.
First, the recognition of the need for Muslims to “live in harmony with
their time” (instead of trying to recreate the original Islamic community of
seventh-century Medina), has led these movements to stress the need for
ijtihad, the intellectual effort of interpretation, to establish how the princi-
ples embodied in the Sharia may be translated into actual legislation in con-
temporary Muslim countries.29 Second, recognition of the need for ijtihad
has led to the recognition of the need for deliberation, and thus acceptance
of the role of deliberative instances representative of the community,
namely representative assemblies and parliaments, in the law-making pro-
cess. This evolution in political thinking has taken Islamic political move-
ments away from theocratic conceptions of the Muslim polity, from the
(originally Khariji) cry in which sovereignty (al-hakimiyya) is conceived as
belonging to God alone (al-hakimiyya—or al-hukm—li-Llah), to more dem-
ocratic conceptions, which recognize that sovereignty belongs to the
people.30
Therein lies a potential problem. As El Fadl points out, “Muslim jurists
have argued that law made by a sovereign monarch is illegitimate because it
substitutes human authority for God’s sovereignty. But law made by sover-
eign citizens faces the same problem of legitimacy,”31 leading to the next
29. In this way, the Islamist political movements have come to reject literalist readings of
scripture and have reverted to the perspectives of the “Islamic-modernist” movement of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, whose leading theorist, the Egyptian Mohammed Abduh
(1849–1905), was preoccupied precisely by the problem of adapting Islamic law to take account
of modern conditions.
30. See International Crisis Group, Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria, 2004 MIDDLE
E. REP. 29.
31. EL FADL, supra note 1, at 4. The nuanced point here is that the substitution of the abso-
lute sovereign will of the citizens over the absolute sovereign will of a monarch both theoretically
override the absolute sovereign will of God—this, Muslim jurists say, is incorrect. What is “Is-
lamically correct” is that the worldly sovereign power, whether it resides in a monarchy or a
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question: Who interprets God’s law? This is partially an issue of limiting
power, and is partially an issue of safeguarding the intentions of the Sharia.
Otherwise, the mechanisms of the Sharia become used by the power struc-
ture to undermine and thwart the intentions of the Sharia.32
For the reasons given above, I believe that a coherent “ends” approach
that embraces a set of values and Islamic human rights doctrine that flows
out of both the intent of the Sharia and the core Islamic worldview is the
contemporary demand. This is where the determination of an “Islamic
State” could currently use the most traction: there is a need for Muslim
jurists to come up with an ijtihad road map, list of issues and methodol-
ogy—in effect a set of criteria—that helps a lay audience of opinion leaders
and those in decision-making positions objectively judge what best deter-
mines an “Islamic” or “Sharia-compliant” governance.
This type of ijtihad would revive spirituality, intellectuality, and ethics,
based on the two commandments common to the three Abrahamic faiths: a
love of God and a simultaneous love of our fellow human beings. The result
will be an ijtihad that:
1. Revives classical Islam’s historic pluralism—an understanding that
created space for at least four major Sunni and several Shia schools
of legal interpretation to coexist, and recognized them as equally
valid in God’s eyes. Sunni-Shia tensions and the uphill nature of
nation-building in Iraq and Afghanistan are concrete demonstra-
tions of this particular challenge.
2. Recreates a nuanced understanding of the difference between sepa-
ration of mosque and state (which Professor Ali Mazrui has elo-
quently demonstrated is “Islamically do-able”) and between
democracy, must recognize that it needs to be delimited by God as absolute sovereign. This is the
meaning of “acting in accordance with Sharia”; it is that in an Islamic State, the worldly ruler
(monarch or citizens) cannot be whimsical and must abide by a set of (Shar’i) principles and fulfill
certain objectives that flow from God. We believe that in spite of what some modern Americans
may believe, the authors of the American Declaration addressed this very issue by declaring the
rights of citizens as God-given (in the language of the American Declaration of Independence,
“endowed by the Creator with certain inalienable rights”) and again emphasized the point with the
phrase “a nation under God.” THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis
added). See infra Part IV for further discussion of the American democracy.
32. El Fadl illustrates this point as follows:
Islamist models, whether in Iran, Saudi Arabia, or Pakistan, have endowed the state with
legislative power over the divine law. For instance, the claim of precautionary measures
(blocking the means) [sadd adh-dhari‘a] is used in Saudi Arabia to justify a wide range
of restrictive laws against women, including the prohibition against driving cars. This is
a relatively novel invention in Islamic state practices and in many instances amounts to
the use of Shari‘ah to undermine Shari‘ah. The intrusive modern state invokes Shari‘ah
in passing laws that create an oppressive condition—a condition that itself is contrary to
the principles of justice under Shari‘ah.
EL FADL, supra note 1, at 15 (emphasis added).
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religion and politics (which he suggests may not be “Islamically do-
able”).33
3. Returns to what Mazrui has called Islam’s authentic spirit of eternal
modernism, defined as a continuous creative synthesis. This in-
volves learning from others, letting others learn from Islam, and
maintaining Islam’s own core of authenticity.34
G. Revisiting the Dar al-Islam/Dar al-Harb Divide
Over the last two centuries, the classical legal differentiation between
the Dar al-Islam (Abode of Islam) and the Dar al-Harb or Dar al-Kufr
(Abode of War or of Unbelief) has undergone a revision among leading
Muslim thinkers. This is partly the result of the increasing presence of Mus-
lim communities living under non-Muslim rule, giving rise to the notion
that these countries were, at the very least, to be considered as Dar al-Aman
or Dar al-’Ahd (Abode of Security or of Treaty).
For example, when Bosnia was brought under Austro-Hungarian rule
at the end of the nineteenth century, the Bosnian mufti Azapagic resisted
the idea that Bosnian Muslims were obliged to emigrate to Istanbul, a posi-
tion which Rashid Rida supported. Rida stressed that “Hijra is not an indi-
vidual religious incumbency to be performed by those who are able to carry
out their duties in a manner safe from any attempt to compel them to aban-
don their religion or prevent them from performing and acting in accor-
dance with their religious rites.”35
33. See Ali A. Mazrui & Albert Schweitzer, Islam Between Secular Modernism and Civil
Society, AM. SOC’Y FOR MUSLIM ADVANCEMENT, http://www.asmasociety.org/perspectives/article
_12.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2010).
34. In the words of Professor Ali Mazrui:
The Muslim world went modernist long before the West did—but then the Muslim
world relapsed back into pre-modernization . . . . What made Islam at the time compati-
ble with the spirit of modernity was Islam’s own spirit of creative synthesis. Islam was
prepared to learn philosophy from the Greeks, architecture from the Persians, mathemat-
ics from the Indians, jurisprudence from the Romans—and to synthesize what was bor-
rowed with Islam’s own core values. That was a modern spirit . . . . Islam was born pre-
modern, but receptive to modernism. Then it went modernist in the heyday of its civili-
zation. Then Islam relapsed into pre-modernism, where it has been stuck to the present
day.
Id. Mazrui adds, however, that
in the political culture of Muslim Senegal we see signs of the historical proposition that
Islam went modernist long before the Western world did. Most of the Muslim world
then relapsed into a premodernist culture of legalistic lethargy and social conservatism.
But even today elements of modernist Islam can be found in unexpected places—from
poverty-stricken Bangladesh ready to follow women in hijab as Prime Ministers to post-
colonial Senegalese Muslims ready to elect a Christian [Leopold Senghor, a Roman
Catholic] for executive President.
Id.
35. Rida made these statements in a pamphlet he published in 1909 in his journal concerning
the situation of Bosnian Muslims. Rashid Rida, Al-hijra wa hukm muslimi al-Busna fiha, AL-
MANAR, 1909; see also Wasif Shadid & Sjoerd van Koningsveld, Loyalty to a non-Muslim Gov-
ernment: An Analysis of Islamic Normative Discussions and of the Views of Some Contemporary
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Muslim leaders, like al-Afghani, Muhammad ‘Abduh, and Rashid
Rida, saw Western Civilization as a model for Muslims to emulate. These
views became popular at the end of the nineteenth century, and advanced
the notion that Western countries were no longer the Dar al-Harb. These
views also laid the groundwork for later Muslim scholars and Muslim lead-
ers in the West to regard the concepts of Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb as
outmoded and irrelevant. Seeking to reinterpret Islamic tradition in light of
the prevailing conditions of the modern age, modern scholars like Shaykh
Faysal Mawlawi, advisor of the Sunni High Court in Beirut, pointed out
that defining the House of Islam and House of Unbelief is problematic in
our day. If the criterion for defining a country belonging to the “Territory of
Islam” is that Muslims are free to practice their religious ceremonies and
observances, then what can be said about the “many non-Muslim countries
where Muslims live safely and practice their religious ceremonies, some-
times with greater freedom than in some ‘countries of the Muslims’?”36
The Moroccan scholar ‘Abd al-’Aziz ibn al-Siddıˆq goes even further
than Mawlawi in reviving the Shafi’i doctrine that says that the Dar al-
Islam exists wherever a Muslim is able to practice the major religious rites
and observances. Ibn al-Siddıˆq notes that Muslims in Europe and America
have created numerous religious institutions, including mosques and
schools, and enjoy great liberty,
including the preaching of Islam and the conversion of Europeans
and Americans to Islam[. H]e concludes that “Europe and
America, by virtue of this fact, have become Islamic countries ful-
filling all the Islamic characteristics by which a resident living
there becomes the resident of an Islamic country in accordance
with the terminology of the legal scholars of Islam.”37
The safety of those who live in Europe (including Muslims) is also evident
in the fact that Muslims travel to Europe “as refugees from those who claim
to be Muslims” because they are “afraid to profess their religious convic-
tions in their own countries.”38
The primary intellectual leader of the Tunisian Islamist Nahda-move-
ment, Rached al-Ghannouchi, also adopted Ibn al-Siddıˆq’s vision:
In 1989, at the occasion of a congress of the Union of Islamic
Organizations in France (UOIF), al-Ghannouchi declared that
France had become Daˆr al-Islaˆm. The leading circles of the UOIF
adopted this view which was to replace the doctrine, previously
adhered to, that France was merely part of Daˆr al-cAhd. This view
Islamists, in POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND IDENTITIES OF MUSLIMS IN NON-MUSLIM STATES 84,
90 (Wasif Shadid & Sjoerd van Koningsveld eds., 1996) (quoting this part of Rida’s pamphlet).
36. Shadid & van Koningsveld, supra note 35, at 97.
37. Id. at 98 (quoting CCABD AL-CAZˆIZ IBN MUHAMMAD IBN AL-SIDDˆIQ, HUKM AL-IQ ˆAMA BI-
BIL ˆAD AL-KUFF ˆAR WA BAY ˆAN WUJ ˆUBIH ˆA FˆI BACD AL-AHW ˆAL 31, 61 (1985)).
38. Id.
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was confirmed in 1991 by the Committee for the Reflection about
Islam in France (CORIF), when it proclaimed in a circular letter
of February 1991 that France had become Daˆr al-Islaˆm due to the
fact that deceased Muslims could be buried in its territory in spe-
cial sections of cemeteries destined for Muslims.39
II. CHALLENGES IN DEVELOPING A COHERENT THEORY OF SHARIA-
COMPLIANCY ON GOVERNANCE
A. Speaking to Power—And Why This Work Must Be Led by Muslim
Scholars in the West
In developing an intellectually (structurally and analytically) coherent
theory of Sharia-compliant ideas on governance centered around rights
(both human and Divine rights), Duke University Professor Ebrahim Moosa
points out that Muslim scholars have to be prepared to engage in political
thought in the widest sense of the word. Often this means scholars have to
contend with being at odds with the forces of political power. “In many
Muslim countries,” Moosa points out, “like Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia,
Iraq, Iran, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Tunisia, intellectuals are subjected to
harassment by traditionalist and fundamentalist quarters alike as well as by
governments for their critical study of religion and for opinions that do not
meet with approval from the religious establishment.”40
Sorbonne Professor Mohammed Arkoun laments the absence of
genuinely independent, creative work on the Islamic tradition . . .
in the Arab world. The close ties between nationalist, authorita-
rian governments who are adamant about using Islam for their
own purposes or are preoccupied with fending off militant Is-
lamist movements . . . makes genuine scholarship impossible. The
capacity of social science to generate the liberating truth about
Islam depends on a political atmosphere conducive to academic
freedom and scientific discovery. Rethinking Islam depends upon
39. Id. (internal citations omitted).
40. Moosa, Dilemma, supra note 1, at 185–86. Arguably the most notable example of paying
a price for one’s integrity was what happened to eighty-year-old Grand Ayatollah Hussein Ali
Montazeri, once the heir apparent to the leadership of the 1979 Iranian Islamic revolution. He was
stripped from his title of Grand Ayatollah and placed under house arrest in 1997 (and released in
2003 because of ill health) for criticizing the regime’s human rights abuses, for suggesting that
clerics should not interfere in government, for suggesting changes in the distribution of power,
and that Ayatollah Khamenei should submit himself to popular elections, curtail his power, and be
accountable and open to public criticism for his actions.
Another example is Professor Abdolkarim Soroush, who once was a high-ranking ideologue
in the Islamic Republic of Iran and was later appointed to the Advisory Council on the Cultural
Revolution by Ayatollah Khomeini. ABDOLKARIM SOROUSH, REASON, FREEDOM, AND DEMOC-
RACY IN ISLAM xi (2000). He was fired from his job for criticizing “the theological, philosophical,
and political underpinnings of the regime.” Id. In addition to being barred from teaching and
discouraged from speaking in public, “[h]e [was] routinely threatened with assassination and
[was] occasionally roughed up by organized gangs of extremists.” Id.
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the freedom to think[,] . . . and thus, for now at least, it must be
done in the West;41
although, even there, Western Islamic scholars have not been immune from
rebuke.42
Arkoun depicts two additional fronts Western Muslim intellectuals
have to fight on: one against social science as practiced by Orientalism in a
disengaged, narrative, descriptive style; the other against the offensive/de-
fensive apologia of Muslims who compensate for repeated attacks on the
“authenticity” and the “identity” of the Islamic personality with dogmatic
affirmations and self-confirming discourse.43
Regarding the first, Muslim intellectuals must contribute to an even
more fundamental diagnosis through the Islamic example, especially re-
garding questions of ethics and politics: to expose “the blindspots, the fail-
ings, the non sequiturs, the alienating constraints, [and] the recurrent
weaknesses of modernity,”44 for “the West has not accepted the challenge
that has arisen from within its own culture”45—despite a generalized crisis
of the soul bequeathed by the end of Marxist eschatology.46 Critical voices
expressing solidarity with the history of Muslims must constantly submit to
demands that their arguments be more “objective,” more “neutral,” less
“polemical,” and less engaged in recurrent forms of protest against the
West. Those who are aligned with Muslim peoples also find themselves
surrounded by a Western worldview that insists on maintaining its pressure
on the rest of the world, and refuses to entertain external views.
Moosa emphasizes Muslim scholars’ concern that human rights
schemes are deployed by Western non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
He believes that these human rights schemes are a weapon to subordinate,
as well as to colonize lands, minds, and bodies47 (namely those who point
out that the models of Western thought are inadequate to current needs), or
are perceived as a strategy of cultural domination from which Muslims
must protect themselves. This point merits some attention. Writing in 1978,
41. ARKOUN, supra note 1, at xi.
42. Professor Abdulaziz Sachedina avers:
It took the crisis I faced with the Muslim religious establishment in 1998 to convince me
that the time had come to state my firm belief in the Koranic notions of human dignity
and the inalienable right to freedom of religion and conscience. Attempts were made to
silence me through a religious edict (fatwaˆ) and to stop Muslim audiences in North
America from listening to my well-articulated plea for better inter-communal relation-
ships through mutual tolerance, respect, and acceptance of the religious value in all
world religions.
SACHEDINA, supra note 1, at xi.
43. ARKOUN, supra note 1, at 1–2.
44. Id. at 119.
45. Id. at 4.
46. That modern science has banished from human consciousness the sense and sensibility of
the sacred is a subject most cogently addressed by writers of the perennial philosophy, who in-
clude Rene Guenon, Frithjof Schuon, S.H. Nasr, and Charles le Gai Eaton among others.
47. Moosa, Poetics, supra note 1, at 205.
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City University of New York Professor Marnia Lazreg suggested that “the
drive for fundamental human rights [was] primarily an ideological one
meant to legitimize the state structure of governments that supported it.”48
In a review of the historical circumstances in which the UDHR was
made in 1948—the contextual historicity of the UDHR—Lazreg reminds
the reader that
fundamental human rights do become ideological when they
cease to be viewed historically and are therefore detached from
the sociopolitical and economic life situations of concrete individ-
uals or groups. The ideological character of the 1948 Declaration
and the prevailing drive for human rights on the part of the U.S.
leadership operate[d] on two levels: First, precedence [was] im-
plicitly given to human as opposed to citizen rights, thereby in-
corporating all human beings across nations and cultures into an
abstract universal community [(an analog of the Islamic global
ummah)] of which the U.S. government [was] the champion. Sec-
ond, the “declaring” of such fundamental rights [had] the effect of
“informing” individuals throughout the non-Western world of ab-
stract rights that may not be implemented locally and [were] in-
creasingly encountering obstacles in Western societies
themselves.49
Lazreg also critiqued the U.S. policy of using human rights as a tool of
international power politics, of applying principles selectively, and of sup-
porting regimes despite evidence of human rights violations, such as Iran
and Morocco because of their support of U.S. geopolitical positions.50 Her
most important observation, for our purpose of developing an Islamic doc-
trine of human rights, is that “if the ultimate goal . . . is to free [a state’s]
citizens from deprivation, then there are ways of going about this task that
are equally or more efficient than those proposed by Western powers.”51
The pursuit of the idea of God for Muslims is an equally valid alternative, at
least at the theoretical level.
This discussion recalls Arkoun’s reminder—that a critical and histori-
cal re-examination of our belief systems, whether about human rights or
about the actual contents of the Holy Scriptures, is still an urgent and indis-
pensable intellectual task. This undertaking offers an excellent opportunity
to bolster religious and non-religious thought in general, by forcing it to
recognize that our beliefs, our religious teachings, and revelation are subject
to historicity.
48. Lazreg, supra note 26, at 32–33.
49. Id. at 34.
50. Id. at 39–40.
51. Id. at 40.
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B. The Epistemological Historicity of Human Rights Discourses
Moosa reminds us of this point. Thinking and deliberating on human
rights (including women’s rights) in the modern and contemporary context
requires a careful analysis of some of the more complex and foundational
presumptions in Muslim legal and ethical philosophy. It also requires an
awareness of post-Empire Islam, where Muslims have (at least in practice)
abandoned the idea of a universal political empire (like the Caliphate ruling
over an ummah) in favor of the nation-state, but have not yet made the
necessary epistemological shift. What we see as the current Muslim crisis,
namely the idea that “the critical hermeneutics of rival epistemologies” is
battling “to establish their relevance to the moral compass of society,” ex-
ists, because, as Moosa posits, the knowledge that needs to be employed in
defining the crisis is lacking.52 This void led to genres of questions based
upon different paradigms—and specifically Western paradigms—of
thought; some may now wonder, “Does Islam need to undergo its own ‘ref-
ormation’ or ‘enlightenment,’ as Christianity underwent in the West?”
While it may be more accurate to say that the West underwent the
Enlightenment than it is to suggest that “Christianity underwent the En-
lightenment,” Arkoun points out that the West53 escaped the clutches of
Christian religious dogma by invoking Enlightenment thought—the progen-
itor of the Western articulation of human rights schemes—as the opposite
of and replacement for Christian mythology.54 At the same time that West-
ern reason performed this “liberating” critique, it simultaneously fell back
into a nostalgic celebration of the putative origins of its civilization, espe-
cially the Greek polis and the first Christian communities, which were for
Western reason the equivalents of the Muslims’ “Pious Elders” (as-salaf as-
salih). Peculiarly, Arkoun points out, Western scholars moved beyond pre-
Enlightenment thought not by eliminating myth, but by integrating a differ-
ent myth into their cognitive activity of reason. Every belief set, religious or
otherwise, has its “accumulated symbolic capital carried and maintained,”
and no form of expression, religious or otherwise, can be detached from its
accumulated symbolic capital, nor can the forms of religious expression be
detached from symbolic and artistic creativity.55
52. Moosa, Poetics, supra note 1, at 7.
53. We exclude America from this, for as we will see below, we believe that America did not
go as far as Europe in eliminating religion and religious thought from its societal worldview.
54. ARKOUN, supra note 1, at 1–2.
55. Id. at 119. We believe that the ethics of secular humanism, and therefore what is called
secular human rights, in fact flows out of the second of the two major religious commandments in
the Abrahamic faiths—stated separately and de-linked from the first—as part of the West’s accu-
mulated symbolic capital. The two commandments being: to love the Lord the One God with all
of one’s heart, mind, soul and strength, and to love one’s neighbor—i.e., all of humanity—as one
loves oneself. Mark 12:33 (New International Version). From the contemplative tradition, the
second commandment is the first contemporaneously restated as “love the image of God in all six
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Moosa addresses the subject of symbolic creativity by reminding the
Muslim reader that “[j]urisprudence, like architecture, is a form of art and
has to do with creation.”56 Classical Muslim jurists, including ash-Shafii,
ash-Shatibi, al-Ghazali, and al-Tufi, among others, collectively created a
system of juridical and legal thought. It behooves modern Muslim jurists
and scholars to recall this “memory of creativity” of a “hermeneutics” nar-
rative and fold it into their contemporary creative efforts in expanding the
hermeneutics envelope.57 This is a necessary step in engaging the inherited
legacy of Muslim thought as we move forward.
More than their modern counterparts, Moosa reminds us that scholars
of Muslim antiquity were extraordinarily aware that during the Prophet’s
time and in subsequent eras, there was a politics of interpretation at work.
This made scholars aware of the need to interpret the canonical sources
within their own social contexts, without being shackled to the history and
culture—and in particular the politics—of the original founding moment.
What they actually executed was a creative act of intellection that “ex-
tracted” from the canonical sources a supra-historical and supra-contextual
legal theory. It provided coherence for the moral and epistemological
framework of Muslim legal and ethical thought on one hand, and on the
other provided a post-hoc rationalization and justification for the legal prac-
tices that were already in circulation in the post-Prophetic period.58
billion of the world’s inhabitants,” or to submerge the self (ego) in the alter Self and alter selves,
or to see the Divine “I” both in oneself and in others.
56. Moosa, Poetics, supra note 1, at 2.
57. Id.
58. An analogy from the physical sciences may be helpful to the lay reader on this point.
When scientists study physics, for example, they study the observable physical world, and by
observation they notice that the varieties of physical forms obey certain patterns—such as the laws
of conservation of energy and momentum in physical interactions. Although they did not create
the physical world of forms, of time, space, and matter—God the Creator did—the science of
physics is a human perception and understanding of that reality. Scientific laws are not “given” to
us by God but “discovered” or “unveiled” by humans; they consist of the human attempt to dis-
cover and express patterns of natural laws in human language and formulas. The sum of these
laws, as a body of science, has to be logically consistent. And as time goes on, earlier beliefs
about these laws stand to be corrected as scientific knowledge, tested by experiments in real
situations, advances. Physicists’ knowledge is by definition incomplete and in some instances
incorrect, but over time as more and more physicists deepen their research and discuss among
themselves the results of their studies, they weed out incorrect understandings. Their base of
correct or firm knowledge grows and expands.
Over years, physicists may argue over many issues. Crises develop when new discoveries
show the inadequacy of old models, which worked in certain dimensions, such as the discoveries
at the end of the nineteenth century that could not be explained by Newtonian physics, and that led
to the rise of relativity theory (dealing with physics at speeds approximating the speed of light)
and quantum physics (dealing with the physics of sub-atomic particles) during the first half of the
twentieth century. It was necessary to show that these theories were consistent with and equivalent
to Newtonian physics at low speeds and large masses.
Thus, the body of scientific knowledge grows and in time a growing consensus develops
among scientists as differences of opinion get ironed out. Applying the principles we learn from
physics, we develop a technology that is useful in advancing the quality of our lives. In addition to
helping us understand God’s creation, by applying our understanding of the laws or science of
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For example, in the Hijaz at the time of Shafi’i (d. 204/820), the term
“Sunna” did not exclusively mean the precedents of the Prophet but was
understood to include accepted precedents in general, equivalent to the or-
ganic and embodied practices of successive generations of Muslims beyond
the precedents of the Prophet and the four Orthodox caliphs. Shafi’i was
uncomfortable with this evolving idea of Sunna as being the living tradition
of the community; it appeared logically incoherent and a potential slippery
slope. He therefore gave precedence to the Sunna of the Prophet as the
second source of law, second only to the Qur’an, and standing above the
praxis of those who came after the Prophet. Since his time and down to our
physics, we can “work with God,” so to speak, to invent machines and technology that are useful
to us. When we do this, we are not really overcoming or denying physical reality; we are enhanc-
ing the quality of our life with our knowledge and understanding of physical laws.
Usul al-fiqh is analogous to the science of physics above in that the Shari‘a is God-given via
a series of injunctions, comprising prescriptions and prohibitions embodied in the Qur’an and
expanded/adumbrated by the Prophet’s precedents and rulings (the Sunna whose sayings are col-
lected in the Hadith), for these two sources are respectively God-given and God-modified when
the occasion warranted.
Jurists in later centuries began to examine this body of injunctions and prohibitions, includ-
ing opinions and decisions made by the Prophet’s companions, most notably the second Caliph
Umar b. al-Khattab and the fourth Caliph Al b. Abi Talib. They sought to “discover” underlying
principles and laws of the Shari‘a to develop a logically consistent science of the Shari‘a; this
study became known as usul al-fiqh. It includes the philosophy, theory, understanding, rationale,
and impulse of the Shari‘a. Just like physicists in the above analogy or any other class of scien-
tists, the scholars of fiqh, known as fuqaha’ (singular faqih), had differences of opinion on matters
some of which are of greater, and some of lesser, consequence to the average Muslim. This is
because jurists’ knowledge is incomplete and in some instances incorrect (just like scientists) but
also because there is often more than one correct answer, even a plurality, based on the Qur’anic
verse 29:69, which reads: “Walladhina jahadu fina lanahdiyannahum subulana; wa innallaha la-
ma‘a-l-muhsinin,” which means: “And those who strive in Our (Cause),—We will certainly guide
them to Our Paths: for verily God is with those who do right.” QUR’AN 29:69. The scholars have
interpreted this verse to mean that there is on some issues more than one way to approach God, all
equally valid and acceptable to God. Also, the hadith that “whoever does ijtihad and gives a right
judgment will have two rewards; but if he errs in his judgment, he will have earned one reward,”
Muslim, Sahih, V, 131, shows that God values sincere effort, that sincere effort is in itself valua-
ble and that jurists engaged in this process of ijtihad received a reward even when wrong as long
as they are sincere. Differences of opinion occurred and still do, but, in time, after centuries of
interaction, a growing consensus developed, and the growing science of usul al-fiqh became in-
creasingly accepted by Muslim scholars (‘ulama’ singular ‘alim) as a valuable science.
By understanding this science, we can apply it to situations—some of which may be new—to
find answers to questions that, although not originally addressed directly in the Qur’an and
Hadith, are consistent with the primary laws and principles of the Shari‘a. The value of under-
standing the reasoning behind the Shari‘a becomes particularly evident when it enables us, in new
circumstances and when faced with modern dilemmas, to apply our reasoning to arrive at a com-
fortably correct decision. The decision may not be unique, but contemporary Muslims should well
remember that Muslim jurists recognized the possibility of differing decisions deemed equally
legitimate and, in their accepting of the different schools of law, created the ideological and juridi-
cal space for such differences to occur and to flourish.
The challenge of our time is not dissimilar to that faced by physicists at the end of the
nineteenth century. The job at hand is to expand the principles of usul al-fiqh so that they not only
apply in a relevant way to the twenty-first century global Islamic ummah but that, when projected
to the classical contexts of time and place, can also be shown to be consistent with the classical
understanding of fiqh.
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day, Shafi’i’s idea of Sunna as being exclusively the practice of the Prophet
has dominated.59
To provide posterity with a coherent, interpretive framework, intellec-
tuals sought to engineer models of Muslim legal hermeneutics that were
coherent and contextually appropriate to their times—and, we must empha-
size, to contexts that were in fact hybrids of various experiences and influ-
ences. In doing so, they shaped the subsequent direction of Islamic legal
thought.
C. Was Man Made for the Sharia, or the Sharia Made for Man?
The tension among jurists, today and in medieval times, centered on
how to regard the relationship between the canonical text and the believing
Muslim. For some, the texts enjoyed priority over the Muslim as the “legal
subject”; for other jurists, starting with the Caliph Umar through the
Hanbali jurist Najm ad-Din al-Tufi (d. 716/1316), the believer is the legal
subject of the law. Umar’s decisions conflate with a host of jurists’ writings
leading up to Tufi’s nearly 700 years later. The decisions culminate in the
idea that public interest, or the common good (maslaha), was the operative
meta-purpose of the revealed law, and that all the Qur’anic textual ordi-
nances and Prophetic injunctions were “coagulations” of maslaha in the
contexts of revelation. The interest of the believer, therefore, stands above
and before the law, and not vice versa; in several instances Umar suspended
textual ordinances in favor of a decision he made,60 arguing that the core
objective of all Sharia laws was the same: to avoid harm and promote the
common good. This argument is reminiscent of Jesus’s announcement that
“[t]he Sabbath [and thus the law] was made for man, not man for the Sab-
bath [Law].”61
Thus, when the context differs from the context of revelation, the ju-
rist’s role is to identify and determine the original maslaha and “re-coagu-
late” it into his new context. Religion is about human ethics, both toward
God and toward Man, and religious law is not about fixing eternally what
“once was” or “now is” the common good, but it is about “the continuous
becoming of the eternal common good.”62
59. As a partial counterpoise to this “fixing” of the Sunnah that de-links it from the continu-
ing evolving praxis of the community is the Shia notion that the live (contemporary) jurisprudent
can in fact override the fatwas of his predecessors, thus giving life to the notion of an evolving
praxis of the community.
60. For examples of this, see Moosa, Poetics, supra note 1, at 12–14, and RAUF, ISLAM: A
SACRED LAW, supra note 1, at 76–78.
61. Mark 2:27.
62. Tufi’s point of view, cited in Moosa, Poetics, supra note 1, at 22–23. This opens the
discussion into the issue of gnosis, of spiritual discernment that comprises the eternal and timeless
content of every Prophetic impulse; an opening into a fresh “receiving” or “radiation” from Di-
vine inspiration.
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The Maliki jurist from Granada Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi (d. 790/1388)
subscribed to this view, promulgated by the Shafi’i jurist al-’Izz ibn Abd as-
Salam (d. 660/1261) in the words:
All obligations refer to the interests of God’s creatures in this
world and the next. God is not in need of people’s worship, nor is
He benefited by the obedience of those who obey, nor is He
harmed by the disobedience of those who disobey.63
The majority of jurists accepted that the Sharia’s meta-purpose of mas-
laha meant the promotion of human interests (masalih al-’ibad). Asserting
that laws were only instituted for the benefit of people in this world and the
next, and because laws are only the means of achieving God’s aims and
intentions, the laws themselves hold no intrinsic value. If, occasionally, the
strict application of the law compromises the aims of the Sharia, then the
law can be set aside or modified so that God’s intentions may be fulfilled.
Jurists adduced this point from the Qur’an itself. In the “vertical” God-
man dimension of religious acts of worship, these acts are never ends in
themselves but means to the greater end, namely remembrance of God
(dhikrullah).64 If and when these means are performed without their in-
tended goals and content of divine remembrance, they are deemed void and
ineffective, at best, and at worst a major sin—defined as an offense against
God. Means—including acts of worship—are therefore sanctified or ac-
cursed by the degree to which we respectively embed in them remembrance
of their proper intent or thwart them by embedding in them contrarian
ends.65
Accepting, then, the view that all Sharia injunctions are “coagulative
instances” of the meta-purpose of the public good (maslaha), Shatibi’s
schema is that all of the Sharia laws—and their maslaha content—radiate
into and manifest in five subject areas and at three degrees of essentiality or
necessity. The six subject areas that all of Sharia laws are intended to pro-
tect and further are: life; dignity or honor (‘ird); religion; family (lineage or
progeny); property; and mind (mental well-being and intellect) at either the
most necessary level (darura), at a lesser level of need (haja) or at the level
of adornment or beautification (tahsin, i.e., not necessary or needed).
The importance of life, for example, is indicated by Qur’anic passages
emphasizing the importance of life and condemning those who take a life
without right,66 by the magnitude of the Shar’i punishment for murder, and
63. Qawa‘id al-Ahkam fi masalih al-anam (Cairo, 1934), vol. II, 70.
64. Remembrance of God trumps (literally, “is greater than”) prayer, avers QUR’AN 29:45.
65. Prayer, for example, is a major obligation; yet God issues a severe warning to those who
pray ostentatiously, “[t]o be seen,” the vitiating clause being “neglectful of [the purpose of] their
prayers,” who pray yet hinder helpful action to others. QUR’AN 107:1–7.
66. See, e.g., QUR’AN 5:35 (“On that account: We ordained for the Children of Israel that if
any one slew a person—unless it be for murder or for spreading mischief in the land—it would be
as if he slew the whole people: and if any one saved a life, it would be as if he saved the life of the
whole people.”).
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by the compensation for unintentional manslaughter. The importance of
family, progeny, and clarity of lineage is given on one hand by the Sharia’s
urging marriage upon reaching puberty, granting men the right to marry
more than one wife, granting women the right to divorce for lack of sexual
gratification, but on the other hand establishing severe penalties for adul-
tery. The recognition of material well-being is proven by the importance of
zakah (charity and tax paid on income and assets to the Treasury to help
take care of the poor), and in modern times through employment or public
welfare to assure a minimum standard of food, clothing, and shelter; while
the importance of property rights is indicated by the Sharia’s severe penalty
on theft. These maqasid (ends, aims, or objectives) can be thought of as
general human rights, on which a broad consensus of Islamic jurists agrees
that proper governance should protect, provide for, and further.67
God protects these aims on Judgment Day, when He calls every person
to account, and determines how humanity has either honored or violated the
rights of God and the rights of creation—including people and animals—
down to “an atom’s weight” of good or evil done.68 God, as Supreme
Judge, will determine every human being’s ultimate and eternal disposition
on Judgment Day (yawm ad-din). Moreover, according to Islamic juristic
tradition, “[t]he rights [or claims] of human beings are not forgiven by God
[even on Judgment Day] unless the human being concerned forgives them
first, and the claims for such rights are not dismissed [by God] unless they
are dismissed by the person concerned.”69 The magnitude of Judgment Day,
and the reality that all beings’ rights will be honored and compensated for
by the Supreme and Absolute Being is the source of the notion of universal-
ity and inalienability of this understanding of Islamic human rights. This
sensibility is additionally implanted by God in our very nature (fitrah),
wherein God’s presence as the immanent (al-Batin) lies.70 The Qur’an and
the Sunnah moreover reveal the equality of humankind and reject any pref-
erential treatment accorded to race, ethnicity, or tribalism. In other words,
individual rights—everyone’s rights, including animals—are so important
to God that the raison d’etre of Judgment Day is to ensure absolute justice
when all claims based on justice are fully and completely settled.
67. Comparing these to the inalienable human rights of the American Declaration of Inde-
pendence, we see in common life and property (in the original draft, later changed to pursuit of
happiness). THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
68. QUR’AN 99:7–8. A hadith speaks of a woman who tortured a cat until it died and for that
was rewarded with hell, while a prostitute was forgiven and rewarded with paradise for having
given a thirsty dog water from a well. Thus, even animals have rights, which humans shall be
responsible for having denied or granted. From these hadiths, we note that God acts on behalf of
these creatures to exact their right or claim against the wrongdoer and rewards the right-doer for
his act.
69. EL FADL, supra note 1, at 26 (quoting the Maliki jurist Ibn al-‘Arabi).
70. “We are nearer to him [humankind] than (his) jugular vein,” says the QUR’AN 50:16.
2010] JUSTIFICATION & THEORY OF SHARIA LAW 479
Abou El Fadl believes that the juristic tradition reduced the five
maqasid to technical objectives, but notes that “the broad values asserted
could serve as a foundation for a systematic theory of individual rights in
the modern age.”71 One contributing factor (but not the only reason) why
the classical jurists describe these as aims of actions rather than rights is
because they operated under a verb-paradigm of language and thought,
rather than a noun-paradigm (explained further below).
The above considerations are among “the difficulties in trying to ex-
plain the Islamic past to contemporary Muslims” that Moosa laments;
which “is to disabuse them of a misconception that the past [referring to the
situation that the classical jurists found themselves contending with] was
perfect and untainted and [in all respects was] therefore a model worthy of
imitation.”72 Lacunae in the imagination of contemporary Muslims that
need filling (in addition to that mentioned above) include: 1) an admission
that the past developed as—and is—a hybrid; 2) a recognition that early
Muslim jurists admitted with great candor that issues of language theory,
rhetoric, and hermeneutics were implicated in the understanding of revela-
tion; 3) that jurists in the pre-modern examples of Ghazali and Tufi—in-
cluding Caliph Umar as primus inter pares in this category of “jurist”
(among Sunni jurists as our caveat)—were not unwilling to “engage” the
canonical texts to “re-coagulate divine intent”; 4) that subtle epistemologi-
cal and hermeneutical transformations have always taken place in Muslim
thought in dealing with the primary sources; and, 5) that the modern experi-
ence has fundamentally changed our notions of self and society from the
role and meaning of these concepts in pre-modern society.
Understanding these pieces of hermeneutical history equips us, and
provides necessary tools in helping us move forward, to ensure that we do
not detach ourselves from the symbolic and artistic creativity of Islamic
thought, but rather that we continue in the tradition of al-Shafi’i, ash-Sha-
tibi, al-Ghazali, and al-Tufi, and continue to build upon their work.
D. The Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights (UIDHR)
At a United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) meeting in Paris on September 19, 1981, Salem Azzam, Secre-
tary General of the Islamic Council of London, put forth a Universal Is-
lamic Declaration of Human Rights.73
Its foreword reads as follows:
 Islam gave to mankind an ideal code of human rights fourteen
centuries ago. These rights aim at conferring honour and dignity
71. EL FADL, supra note 1, at 24; see also id. at 41 n.27.
72. Moosa, Poetics, supra note 1, at 40.
73. SALEM AZZAM, UNIVERSAL ISLAMIC DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (Islamic Council
1981) [hereinafter UIDHR].
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on mankind and eliminating exploitation, oppression and injus-
tice. Human rights in Islam are firmly rooted in the belief that
God, and God alone, is the Law Giver and the Source of all
human rights. Due to their Divine origin, no ruler, government,
assembly or authority can curtail or violate in any way the human
rights conferred by God, nor can they be surrendered.
Human rights in Islam are an integral part of the overall Is-
lamic order and it is obligatory on all Muslim governments and
organs of society to implement them in letter and in spirit within
the framework of that order.
It is unfortunate that human rights are being trampled upon
with impunity in many countries of the world, including some
Muslim countries. Such violations are a matter of serious concern
and are arousing the conscience of more and more people
throughout the world.
I sincerely hope that this Declaration of Human Rights will
give a powerful impetus to the Muslim peoples to stand firm and
defend resolutely and courageously the rights conferred on them
by God.
This Declaration of Human Rights is the second fundamental
document proclaimed by the Islamic Council to mark the begin-
ning of the 15th Century of the Islamic era, the first being the
Universal Islamic Declaration announced at the International
Conference on The Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings be
upon him) and his Message, held in London from 12 to 15 April
1980.
The Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights is based
on the Qur’an and the Sunnah and has been compiled by eminent
Muslim scholars, jurists and representatives of Islamic move-
ments and thought. May God reward them all for their efforts and
guide us along the right path.
Paris 21 Dhul Qaidah 1401
19th September 1981
Salem Azzam, Secretary General74
The UIDHR identifies twenty-three rights, which are enumerated in its
twenty-three articles:
I Right to Life
II Right to Freedom
III Right to Equality and Prohibition Against Impermissible
Discrimination
IV Right to Justice
V Right to Fair Trial
VI Right to Protection Against Abuse of Power
74. Id.
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VII Right to Protection Against Torture
VIII Right to Protection of Honour And Reputation
IX Right to Asylum
X Rights of Minorities
XI Right and Obligation to Participate in the Conduct and
Management of Public Affairs
XII Right to Freedom of Belief, Thought and Speech
XIII Right to Freedom of Religion
XIV Right to Free Association
XV The Economic Order and the Rights Evolving Therefrom
XVI Right to Protection of Property
XVII Status and Dignity of Workers
XVIII Right to Social Security
XIX Right to Found a Family and Related Matters
XX Right of Married Women
XXI Right to Education
XXII Right of Privacy
XXIII Right to Freedom of Movement and Residence75
E. Why Muslim Scholars Are Conflicted About the Universal Islamic
Declaration of Human Rights (UIDHR)
As a Muslim, Mohammed Arkoun agrees that the virtue of this decla-
ration is that it expresses the convictions, thoughts, and demands that con-
temporary Muslims are beginning to embrace. He points out that no
references were made to the canonic corpus of Shi’i Hadith, which would
have made it more “Islamically universal,” although the effort to “cloak
such precious rights as religious freedom, freedom of association, freedom
of thought, and freedom of travel in the full authority of the Islamic tradi-
tion is not a negligible accomplishment.”76 The political value of such a
document is in creating a legal arsenal useful in bringing about positive
change in the Muslim world, and thus Arkoun endorses the utility of finding
authorities within the religious tradition who would be willing “to conse-
crate rights that need to be taught and defended in the oppressive political
contexts unfortunately so widespread in today’s world.”77
As a powerful illustration of this, Arkoun cites the instance where ju-
rists tried, for example in Algeria, to form a league for human rights to
protect citizens. The state felt that it was under attack and retaliated by
refusing to grant permission to organize; it prosecuted the instigators and
solicited the formation of a competing association to seize the initiative in
this domain without threatening the establishment. “At that moment,” he
adds, “the Islamic Declaration of Human Rights acquired its ideological and
psychological purpose: to reassure . . . believer-citizens by proclaiming that
75. Id.
76. ARKOUN, supra note 1, at 107.
77. Id.
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God guaranteed rights; to undercut the [notion that these were merely] secu-
lar demands of Western origin, and to re-establish confidence in the ‘mo-
dernity’ of Islamic law and its universal and intangible character.”78
As an intellectual and a scholar, however, Arkoun finds the apologetic
function and inspiration of the text “undeniable,” a discourse “based on
mimetic overbidding [that] picks up the enunciations of Western declara-
tions and confers upon them an Islamic origin”;79 and as a historian, he is
shocked by an anachronism that projects modern concepts backward toward
the founding age of Islam. He reckons these apologetic streams of theologi-
cal discourse coming from Islam (and as well when they emanate from
Judaism and Christianity) as strategies of self-justification and thus of re-
ciprocal exclusion aimed at preserving a monopoly on control of revelation
and all the symbolic capital that flows from it. Historical criticism is too
often missing, he asserts. Each side seeks to annex for itself the ethical-
legal privileges and the ideological functions that—now more than ever—
are attached to the bewitching theme of human rights, an error, he admits,
that he has tried hard to avoid.
If someone of Arkoun’s intellectual rigor has had to try hard to keep
from falling into this error, how can we not then empathize with social
actors for whom such considerations are either too abstruse or at best minor
glosses, and are unable to resist the temptation of de-contextualizing ideas,
beliefs, and doctrines advanced by their culture out of context? Arkoun de-
plores how the Qur’an
has been ripped from its historical, linguistic, literary, and psy-
chological contexts and then continually recontextualized in vari-
ous cultures and according to the ideological needs of various
actors. This comment, though trivial for the historian, the linguist,
and the anthropologist, is rejected by the theologian and under-
stood poorly if at all by the ordinary believer.80
In his judgment, both Muslim liberals and Islamist movements have
fallen into this same hermeneutic trap: The latter brought about an ideologi-
cal hardening that rejects modernity and restores elements of the Sharia—
utterly out of context and juxtaposed with legal codes borrowed from the
West—and from which the status of women suffered most, especially from
legislation where intent diverges widely from effect. He therefore questions
the hermeneutic propriety (not the political propriety) as less of an apolo-
getic showing that Islam as a religion is open to the proclamation and de-
fense of human rights, but rather that the Qur’an, the Word of God, defined
these rights at the beginning of the seventh century, well before Western
revolutions.81
78. Id. at 110.
79. Id. at 109.
80. Id. at 5.
81. Id. at 107–09.
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Others share this general view. Ebrahim Moosa regards the work on
human rights in Islamic thought as being
very mediocre: there is too often a haste to equate Muslim geneal-
ogies of rights discourse to be the equivalent of liberal and secular
rights. The Islamic Council of Europe’s human rights charter has
fallen into this trap; and so have the best of minds, like my friend
Rashid Ghannushi. Often there is a rhetorical flourish to make
equivalences whereas in fact such alignments are out of step with
other aspects of even the most reform minded jurisprudence of
say a Yusuf al-Qaradawi or say Allal al-Fasi, more than a half
century ago.82
F. Non-Muslim Critiques of Islamic Human Rights Discourses
One of the most pointed critiques of Islamic human rights claims
comes from University of Denver Professor Jack Donnelly. Lest he be mis-
understood, he clearly points out that his critique is structural and analyti-
cal rather than cultural and normative. He “readily agree[s] that the notions
of democracy, pluralism, and human rights are . . . in harmony with Islamic
thought,”83 but argues that—despite the fact that Islam, like Christianity,
can, and even ought to, be read as inherently compatible with those modern
values—“traditionally, as with Christianity throughout most of its history,
[Islamic legal thought] has not been read in that way.”84
Donnelly observes that the extensive, contemporary Arab or Muslim
human rights literature almost invariably includes “a listing of the basic
rights established by modern conventions and declarations, and . . . a seri-
ous attempt to trace them back to Koranic texts”85 and takes as its standard
argument the idea that “Islam has laid down some universal fundamental
rights for humanity as a whole, which are to be observed and respected
under all circumstances . . . [as] fundamental rights for every man by virtue
of his status as a human being.”86 Despite his belief in the compatibility of
Islamic thought and human rights, Donnelly views such assertions of histor-
ical connection as “almost entirely baseless.”87
In this vein, Donnelly faults Muslims for citing scriptural passages of
divine injunctions not to kill and to consider life inviolable, and equating
that to the “right to protection of life.”88 In fact, he points out, the “right to
justice” is the duty of rulers to establish justice; the “right to freedom,” a
duty not to enslave unjustly (narrower, even, than a general duty not to
82. Letter from Ebrahim Moosa to Feisal Abdul Rauf (Mar. 8, 2005) (on file with author).
83. JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 75 (Cornell
Univ. Press 2d ed. 2003) (internal quotation omitted).
84. Id. at 74.
85. Id. at 72.
86. Id. (quoting ABUL A’LA MAWDUDI, HUMAN RIGHTS IN ISLAM (1976)).
87. Id.
88. Id.
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enslave); “[e]conomic rights,” duties to help to provide for the needy; and
“the purported ‘right to freedom of expression’ is actually an obligation to
speak the truth—that is, not even an obligation of others but an obligation
of the alleged right-holder.”89 He observes that Abdul Aziz Said, Majid
Khadduri, and others talk about precepts and values that either involve
rights-less duties of others “or are rights held because one has a certain
legal or spiritual status [(e.g., Muslim or non-Muslim, man or woman)], not
simply because one is a human being.”90
He agrees with Arkoun’s point above, however, that
rooting contemporary human rights ideas and practice in such
sources and resources will, for many Muslims, give them a depth,
meaning, and impact they could not otherwise attain—just as
rooting the rights of the Universal Declaration in the Bible gives
them a special meaning and force to many Christians.91
Donnelly admits that Muslims are “regularly and forcefully called
upon—by scripture, tradition, religious leaders, and ordinary believers—to
treat others with respect and dignity. They are enjoined, in the strongest
possible terms, to pursue both personal well-being and social justice.”92 But
these injunctions reflect “the values of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, [and] they appeal to divine commands that establish duties, not
(human) rights. The practices traditionally established to realize these val-
ues simply did not include equal and inalienable rights held by all human
beings.”93 What matters in Islam, he asserts, in the realm of “human rights”
(i.e., human dignity) “[are duties] rather than rights, and the rights one does
hold are a consequence of one’s status or actions, not on the moral fact of
being human.”94
He urges his Muslim reader not to be deluded about the past “histori-
cally dominant [legal] practice of most Muslim societies”; just as he chides
“most Christian societies throughout most of [Christian] histor[y]” for hav-
ing “treated non-Christians as inferior, despite the apparently universalistic
egalitarianism of the New Testament.”95 Donnelly recognizes that “the
Holy Qur’an certainly does not require Muslims to accept such legal ideas
and their associated practices,” and is supportive of the “many contempo-
rary Muslims who (entirely justifiably) reject such views.”96 This should
not, however, “obscure central elements of the meaning and importance of
human rights today.”97
89. Id. at 72–73.
90. Id. at 73 (emphasis added).
91. Id. at 75.
92. Id. at 73.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 74.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 76.
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After critiquing human rights in the pre-modern West, traditional Af-
rica, Confucian China, and the caste system of India, Donnelly says that
“human rights are, among other things, means to realize human dignity.”98
It is simply not true, he asserts,
that all peoples at all times have had human rights ideas and prac-
tices, if by “human rights” we mean equal and inalienable para-
mount moral rights held by all members of the species. Most
traditional legal and political practices are not just human rights
practices dressed up in different clothing. And those who insist
that they are, whatever their intention may be, make an argument
that not only can be, but also regularly has been used by repres-
sive regimes to support denying their citizens internationally rec-
ognized human rights.99
Donnelly favors (with Penna and Campbell)
cross-cultural dialogue that “will allow the incorporation of non-
Western symbolism into the international human rights discourse,
and make support for human rights more powerful in non-West-
ern societies.” But that dialogue must be based on a clear and
accurate understanding of the nature of internationally recognized
human rights and a reading of the historical record that can bear
empirical scrutiny.100
The literature he critiqued (including that of Muslim writers on human
rights) is, he concludes, “theoretically muddled or historically inaccurate
(and often both)”:101
Nothing is gained by confusing human rights with justice,
fairness, limited government, or any other values or practices. . . .
[H]uman rights will be threatened if we do not see that the human
rights approach to, say, fairness is very different from other ap-
proaches. . . . Thus I continue to insist that the claims that I ad-
dress in this chapter merit the most vigorous rebuttal.102
III. HOW MIGHT AN ISLAMIC HUMAN RIGHTS
DOCTRINE BE ESTABLISHED?
Catholic thinker Raimundo Pannikar says that “instead of trying to
transliterate the concept of human rights into another culture,” which is
what the above-mentioned critiques of Islamic human rights reveal, “we
should search for the homeomorphic equivalent for human rights in another
culture.”103 If the meta-objective of “modern human rights is to protect and
98. Id. at 85.
99. Id. at 87.
100. Id. (internal citation omitted).
101. Id. at 87.
102. Id.
103. Moosa, Dilemma, supra note 1, at 207.
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show respect for human dignity, then we” must investigate how (in our
case) Islamic law satisfies that need.104 Where historically Muslims may
have veered from this Islamic ideal, we need to demonstrate how Islamic
law can be re-deployed to remedy this.
We believe that a supra-contextual analysis of the structural and para-
digmatic differences between the modern Western concept of a human right
and the classic juridical Islamic concept of a human right will reveal a re-
markable overlap—and arguably an identity—between them. The apparent
difference, as we will show, arises from the blending of several meanings in
the Western understanding.
Then we examine the substance of a right in each narrative. This, in
our opinion, requires examining the contextual metaphysical and historical
narratives that explain how the values or objectives of the rights are
sourced, how they are selected, and, finally, what political enforcement
mechanisms exist to enforce them. In doing so, we believe that a perspec-
tive can be found from which parity exists between Donnelly’s Western and
Ghannushi’s Islamic understandings of a human right—an understanding
that makes us see that the differences are not as different as some assert,
and are, in fact, bridgeable. Moosa suggests that while “secular human
rights and Islamic rights . . . are indeed conceptually different things[,] . . .
contemporary Muslim thought may be able to produce a rights system . . .
not dissimilar to secular human rights declarations in their outcomes.”105
Before proceeding, we wish to highlight two important differences that
have bearing on our discussion. The first difference is between the language
paradigms of Arabic and Western thought, which has arguably resulted in
the second difference, namely a “corporate” mental grid in Western think-
ing about the nature of reality. Understanding these two differences will
help bridge Islamic human rights and Western human rights discourses.
A. The Arabic Verb-Based Language and Thought Versus the Western
Noun-Based Language and Thought
A key difference between the Arabic verb-based language approach
and the noun-based language approach of Greek and post-Enlightenment
Western languages is that between the Semitic and Indo-European lan-
guages. The late professor Wilfred Cantwell Smith, one time Head of
Harvard’s Center for the Study of World Religions, pointed out that in Se-
mitic (and classical Japanese), verbs are primary:
Studying Arabic, a Semitic language, starts with studying verbs
and their varieties. . . . The Indo-European languages, especially
Greek, gave the noun a much higher rank, “so that ever since in
Western thought reality has tended to be conceived in terms of
104. Id.
105. Id. at 187.
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entities, while in the Old Testament [and the Qur’an], it is con-
ceived primarily in terms of events.”106
The Qur’an, for example, speaks often of Jews and Christians, but never
once does it mention the terms “Judaism” or “Christianity,” suggesting
that such nouns, although semantically sensible, are ontologically incoher-
ent or unreal.107
The Qur’an and Sunnah utilize the Semitic verb-based language; the
Sharia’s “raw data” consists of a list of do’s and don’ts—analogous to an
expanded Ten Commandments—between ontologically real actors. Muslim
jurists thought in a verb-based paradigm rather than a noun-based one; we
believe this contributed to their paradigm as starting from a frame of refer-
ence of duties and obligations. They therefore described the maqasid of the
Sharia as objectives of laws governing human action within a narrative of
ontological actors and the functional relationship between them—their re-
spective status towards each other (God, the Caliph, Sultan, or Governor
and the ruled; the judge and his judgment of others, parent-child, husband-
wife, employer-employee, etc.).
106. RAUF, WHAT’S RIGHT WITH ISLAM, supra note 1, at 113 (quoting WILFRED CANTWELL
SMITH, THE MEANING AND END OF RELIGION (1962)). Smith additionally demonstrated that the
use of the terms Judaism, Christianity, and Islam to refer to systems of observances and beliefs—
of an institutionalized historical tradition—is a modern one that did not appear until the seven-
teenth century. Through a study of Muslim book titles through the centuries, he noticed that “since
the latter part of the nineteenth century, there has demonstrably been a sudden and almost com-
plete shift to a use of the term Islam to name a religion.” Id. at 114. Prior to that, it always meant
“the act of submission,” as in Qur’an 49:17 where God commands the Prophet to inform the
Bedouin Arabs, “Don’t favor me with your islam [la tamunnu ‘alayya islamakum].” Similarly,
being “Christian” until the sixteenth century meant being “Christ-like,” rather than being “a
Christian,” i.e., a member of the “institution of Christianity.”
We believe this shift in language was also a result of the invention of the corporation (the
Chartered Company) and its impact upon language in post-sixteenth century Europe and the West,
which resulted in the greater frequency of the “personification” of ideas and ascribing to them
“action capacity.” That modern Muslims have bought into this language paradigm is indicated by
their often asking, “What does Islam, the Quran, the Hadith say about something?” whereas classi-
cal scholars of Islam would never use such language. They would ask, “What does God, or the
Prophet, say?” Today an English speaking imam in a sermon would say: “The Quran says such
and such” or “there is a hadith that says such and such.” An Arab speaker would never say that,
for it would sound absurd to say qal al-qur’anu, or qala hadithun; he would say, instead: “God the
Exalted says in His Noble Book [qala-llahu ta‘ala fi kitabihi-l-karim] such and such” or “The
Messenger of God, peace and blessings be upon him, said in an authentic report [qala rasul ullahi
fi hadithin sahih] such and such.” God and the Prophet are speakers; the Qur’an and Hadith are
“reports” of Divine and Prophetic speech respectively. The difference, though subtle, is huge—
and often ignored—and we believe is of import in our discussion on human rights.
The Qur’an moreover refers to humans as “actions.” For example, Jesus Christ is called in
4:171 as a (spoken) word of God (i.e., a Divine act) conveyed to Mary (kalimatu-hu alqaha ila
maryam). Also see 11:46, where God informs Noah that his son who drowned as a result of
rejecting Noah’s message “was a bad action” (inna-hu ‘amal-un ghayru salih-in).
107. Continuing the point made in our previous footnote, modern Westerners often ask, “How
might we compare what Islam says versus what Christianity says?” on a particular issue. This is
not a coherent statement in classical Islamic language.
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B. Comparing the Western and Islamic Formal Analytic Structures of a
Human Right
The Islamic juridical concept of an individual’s “right” starts with an
examination of how rights come into being—what we might call an “ontol-
ogy” or “etiology” of rights. In this picture an individual’s right to some-
thing (the right-holder) is the corollary of another’s duty to fulfill that right
(the duty-bearer). For example, if Ann employs Bob for a task, Bob—upon
agreeing to the employment—receives the “obligation” to complete the
task. Bob’s obligation in turn grants Ann the corollary “right” to demand
Bob’s work. Ann’s right, in the Islamic legal view, only “arises” as a claim
if Bob does not fulfill his contractual obligation. Bob has a right to get paid;
but this right does not “exist” as a claim until he completes the task, and,
even when the right is available, is not “exercised” unless Ann fails in ful-
filling her obligation to pay Bob; her “duty” to pay Bob arising upon Bob’s
completion of the task. Bob’s freely agreeing to take on the job is impor-
tant; if Ann enslaved Bob, the rights narrative is substantially altered. Both
have to be happy with the deal; they both have to find it adding to their
pleasure and satisfaction.
Bob’s right to get paid emerges from a contractual narrative that pro-
vides the context to the claimed right; while his right to get paid is simulta-
neous to, and is the existential corollary of, Ann’s failing her obligation to
pay him, they both are dependent on a prior action—Bob’s completing the
job. Bob’s failure to complete the job gives rise to Ann’s right to demand
his work, both of which emerged out of a prior action—namely Ann’s em-
ploying Bob and Bob’s freely accepting to take on the job.
Our narrative of mutual rights and obligations started with Ann’s act of
employing Bob. The only way we can start earlier in the narrative is to
assert that Ann had an antecedent right to employ someone, which brought
about the event of Ann’s seeking and finding Bob, and her employing Bob
after perhaps a negotiation, which in turn created the succeeding narrative
of mutual rights and obligations.
In this story so far, we see that rights are first and dependent on inter-
action between two or more players. (It takes two to tango—otherwise the
concept of tango, and thus in our case a “right,” cannot even be said to
exist, for a right is a claim against someone else). Second, rights “flow” out
of antecedent actions. (If there is no prior agreement between Ann and
Bob, neither has an obligation towards, nor possesses a right against, the
other—the specific right disappears.) Third, someone’s rights are always
the flip side of another’s “obligations.” An obligation is either a self-im-
posed or externally imposed imperative, a command to do (or not do) a
given action from the viewpoint of the actor of the action. From the view-
point of the recipient of the action, the obligatory action is seen and exper-
ienced as a “rightful claim” against the actor for his omission of obligation
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or duty, or a “right” for short.108 Fourth, a storyline, or narrative, of causes
exists that brings a respective right and obligation into being from a prior
action, which itself may be dependent on another right and obligation.
A contextual, contractual narrative, therefore, is the ontological source
for the simultaneous creation of the right and its corollary obligation.
The post-modern Western (secular humanist) notion of a fundamental,
universal, and inalienable human right is that it is an entitlement that a per-
son has just because he or she is human, and which flows out of the mere
fact of the person’s human-being-ness. It starts from a perspective that
posits a set of unwavering and generalizable (human) rights for each indi-
vidual at all times that gives rise to obligatory actions from the duty-bear-
ers. It allows the individual to make a claim against society, or the state, for
its satisfaction, and generally ignores any contextual narrative prior to the
existence of the individual human being as irrelevant.
If that was all there was to the structural definition of the Western
concept of a human right, it would be easier to correlate it to the Islamic
structural definition of a human right. The Western definition of human
rights, however, conflates several ideas as axiomatic:
• The object of the right (that which is to be enjoyed);
• A set of conventionally agreed upon selected values that find their
expression in the determination of rights;
• An implied (but unstated Biblical) narrative of what a human being
is (within an implied but not always expressed societal contract and
narrative of justice, mercy, etc.); and
• An implied political enforcement mechanism (a legal mechanism
that translates into power) by which the right may be exercised.109
This theory of human rights blends the above ideas. Thus, Donnelly is
forced to make statements like:
• “Rights are not reducible to the correlative duties of those against
whom they are held.”110
• “Neither is having a right reducible to enjoying a benefit.”111
• “Most good things are not the objects of human rights. The emphasis
on human rights in contemporary international society thus implies
selecting certain values for special emphasis . . . . But it also in-
108. Moreover, the actor who fulfills his obligation commits a “right”; the one who rejects,
denies, and does not fulfill his obligation commits a “wrong.”
109. Unless one grasps these components, the non-Western religious reader is either bound to
be confused by Western theoretical descriptions of human rights, find them ontologically incoher-
ent, feel himself subjected to a moral proselytizing from an alien moral ethic (usually secular
humanistic), subject to a political and/or intellectual manipulative power play from a Western
source, or any combination thereof.
110. DONNELLY, supra note 83, at 8.
111. Id.
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volves selecting a particular mechanism—rights—to advance those
values.”112
• “The source of human rights is man’s moral nature.”113
We observe that Donnelly blends different meanings of rights together;
thus, one meaning of “rights”—as conveyor of values—is blended with an-
other meaning of “rights”—as a (presumed) political power mechanism, to
ensure the fulfillment of the object of the right. Because the ontological
narrative of the rights is left unmentioned, such a rights model requires
structural modifications to make them ontologically coherent, such as:
“Rights are actually put to use, and thus important enough to talk about,
only when they are at issue, when their enjoyment is questioned, threatened,
or denied.”114 Donnelly is further forced to tweak the analytical structure of
rights by positing what he calls the “possession paradox”: “‘having’ a right
is of most value precisely when one does not ‘have’ (the object of) the
right,” thereby embedding in the very concept of the right its defining
“object.”115
Muslim jurists operated under a paradigmatic frame of reference and
narrative that started with the list of a human being’s obligatory actions or
duties. In this case, as El Fadl points out, “they thought of individual rights
as arising from a legal cause brought about by the suffering of a legal
wrong. A person does not ‘possess’ a right until he or she has been wronged
and obtains a claim for retribution or compensation as a result.”116 More
accurately, we would say that the right certainly existed as the corollary of
the obligation of the duty-bearer, but that the exercise of the right can only
arise when the duty-bearer fails to fulfill his duty. Looked at from an Is-
lamic duty-holder’s frame of reference, Donnelly’s “possession paradox”
cannot even exist, because the right is ontologically dependent on a “dere-
liction of duty” within a values narrative; it is not even dependent on a
fulfillment of duty. To use Donnelly’s language, “a world of saints[ where]
rights [are] widely respected, rarely asserted, and almost never en-
forced,”117 is in fact a world where everyone does their duty. We may ask
therefore if in such a world wherein rights are almost never enforced and
rarely asserted, can we still truly say they exist? If so, how can we know
112. Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
113. Id. at 14.
114. Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
115. Id. at 9.
116. EL FADL, supra note 1, at 27.
117. DONNELLY, supra note 83, at 9. Another correction that Donnelly is forced to introduce
[in order to introduce the societal contractual aspect into the picture] is to differentiate between
“assertive exercise” of the right: when it is exercised to “activat[e] the obligation of the duty-
bearer”; “active respect” of the right: when “the duty-bearer takes the right into account” in his
behavior “without it ever being claimed”; and “objective enjoyment” of the right: when “rights
apparently never enter into the transaction . . . [where] neither right-holder nor duty-bearer gives
them any thought.” Id.
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such rights exist, much less even measure the extent to which they exist?
The question remains unanswered by Donnelly.
From such an Islamic paradigmatic perspective, Western human rights
(within a corporation-style conceptual narrative that personifies non–
ontologically real actors: the state, the law, the courts, etc.) are not “real”
assets but are a useful legal fiction, like saying that the ontologically unreal
corporation is in fact a “person” that acts. Its value lies in ensuring that
duty-bearers will in fact discharge their obligations—or, more importantly,
will not fail to discharge their obligations—on a conventionally agreed-
upon set of essential duties that are fundamentally required to ensure a
threshold level of human dignity.118
Michael Perry best expresses, in a duty-holders frame of reference, that
human rights doctrines are essentially to prevent the abuse of one human
being by another. He asserts that there are certain actions or “things” that
“ought not to be done to any human being and certain other things [that]
ought to be done for every human being.”119 It is this basic threshold set of
“ought-to’s” and “ought-not-to’s” that from a duty-bearer’s frame of refer-
ence underlies the modern notion of human rights.
The values and benefits enjoyed under the Islamic system flow from a
narrative between God and Man. The main difference between the contem-
porary West and the Muslim World is that Muslim nations long for an em-
powering mechanism to guarantee these rights.
C. An Islamic Narrative of Rights
The classical Islamic juridical notion of human rights flows out of a
contractual narrative between God and Man. It also presumes ontologically
real players. God created humankind, and Man freely entered into a con-
tractual agreement or covenant with God. This is given by verse 33:72 of
the Qur’an: “Indeed we offered the Trust to the heavens, the earth and the
mountains, but they refused to assume it, fearing it; but Man [freely] as-
sumed it. Indeed he is unjust, [and] ignorant.”120 Humanity agreed to take
on the task of divine vicegerency on earth, and, prior to being incarnated on
earth, took an oath with God, bearing witness against itself that it would not
forget its duty to God.121
118. This opens the door to the questions of how truly universal and inalienable these rights
are. At face value, some of these rights will have to be abridged to those who violate others’
rights. Thus, for example, a convicted murderer would forfeit his “inalienable right” to life by his
action.
119. MICHAEL PERRY, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUR INQUIRIES 5 (1998).
120. QUR’AN 33:72.
121. This event is given in QUR’AN 7:172, wherein God asks humanity “Am I not your Lord?”
to which humanity answered, “Yes, we bear witness; lest you should say on the Day of Resurrec-
tion ‘We were unaware of this.’”
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The relationship between God and Man is analogous to that between
Ann and Bob above; it is a covenantal one, wherein Man freely assumed a
contractual obligation to fulfill a set of tasks, the farai’id, comprising both
acts prohibited and prescribed (the “thou shalt not’s” and “thou shalt do’s”
respectively)—both towards God (i.e., acts of worship) and toward fellow
human beings and the rest of creation (acting justly, mercifully, generously,
etc.). Simultaneously with this set of obligatory duties, a set of corollary
rights arises for the recipients of the duties. Specifically from the list of
duties Man has toward God, thus, arises “God’s rights,” and from God’s
duties to Man and from Man’s duties to fellow-man arise human rights.
In this worldview, if Ann existed all by herself with no Bob, or vice
versa, neither the right nor the obligation could exist. Both are dependent,
first, on the existence of a relationship between Ann and Bob, and, sec-
ondly, on the nature of the contractual relationship. A dynamic narrative
plays out: a scenario between right-holders and simultaneous duty-bearers.
Failed duty-bearers elicit claimed and exercised rights, which in turn elicit
other duty-bearers to fulfill their obligations. Rights followed by subsequent
duties arise between two or more players; they arise concurrently like two
sides of a coin. One side of the coin may be minted before the other, but in
general there can be no right-holder without a duty-bearer.
How the narrative plays out is a function of the sum of the language
paradigm and its underlying metaphysics. Although not required, a verb-
based paradigm (like Arabic) that starts with verbs will start with actions
between ontologically real entities that in turn emphasize the “obligatory
duties” of players that simultaneously create corollary “rights” that accrue
to the recipients of the duties. Again, although not required, a noun-based
paradigm will start with “ontologically real” rights that each player pos-
sesses, and out of which entitlements to corollary obligatory duties fall
upon those responsible for their discharge.
Shifting to a noun-based rights paradigm would mean a change from
the frame of reference where the actors are obliged to perform a set of
obligatory duties to the frame of reference of the recipients of the obliga-
tory actions. To do this we have to map the duties required of the various
parties into their corresponding rights, and start there. Then the paradigm
“plays out” with the idea that the actors possess a number of rights which in
turn entitle the right-owners to a set of obligatory duties from those obliged
to perform them. In this frame of reference, actors possess rights, and obli-
gations or duties are either ontologically dependent on the rights or “flow”
out of them. The Islamic metaphysical narrative would in this case have had
to sound like something along the following lines:
God created humankind to fulfill certain antecedent Divine “rights.”
The Divine rights “create” a set of human obligations, both toward God and
toward creation as recipients of these obligatory human actions. Out of
human rights flow a set of obligations from God to humankind, and from
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humankind to each other, where humans are recipients of this set of obliga-
tory actions. Such a frame of reference—of Divine rights that are ontologi-
cally prior to human obligations—did indeed develop within the spectrum
of Islamic thought via a creative esoteric reading of the Qur’an a` la the
thirteenth-century Sufi thinker and philosopher Muhyiddin Ibn al-’Arabi.122
The difference in the starting point of the narrative does not affect the
cause-effect relationships between successive rights and duties in the narra-
tive. Neither does it affect the logical structural ontology of rights, of how
they come into being. Whether we start with God’s “rights” resulting in the
creation of humankind with resulting human obligations, or begin our story
with God’s creating Man and Man’s agreeing to assume certain obligations,
the net result is that Man’s set of obligations to God is the same. Analogous
to the Ann and Bob relationship above, the Qur’anic metaphysical picture is
that of God “employing” Man to assume the task of being God’s vicegerent
on earth. Man’s freely agreeing to take on this task creates a simultaneous
set of mutual obligations and rights between God and Man.
The Qur’anic narrative is that God created Man, and gave him life, free
will, and the urge to find his happiness/personal fulfillment in the free exer-
cise of his will. Man’s nature is God-given, and only God has the authority
to take it back or alter it.123 Thus, human life, human liberty/freewill, and
the human’s pursuit of his or her happiness/fulfillment are the three meta-
attributes—therefore universal and inalienable—of Man. The “guarantor”
of both the universality and inalienability of these meta-attributes is God;
the “moment” or time—thus the cause—of this guarantee is God’s absolute
judgment on Judgment Day. Anyone who violates another’s life, freewill
(i.e., liberty), and makes another unhappy (without just cause, such causes
to be consistent with the divinely given set of ethical considerations) will
have to account for his or her action before the Creator at that time. Without
122. For example, the “right” of God to forgive, personified in the Divine Attribute of The
Forgiver (and other similar Divine Attributes) “demands” in the archetypal world that the Divine
Will order the Divine Attribute of “Creator” to create a being that is free to disobey God (i.e., sin),
feel remorse, and ask for Divine forgiveness so that the Divine “right” of Forgiver can manifest.
This Divine right embodied in the Attribute, the “Just,” in turn, demands of this created (human)
being a set of human obligations or duties. But this Divine “right,” to be just, simultaneously
requires the manifestation of the Attribute of The Avenger to exact remedial claims and sanctions
that God controls. This narrative could possibly be seen to emerge from Qur’an 33:72–73 which
read, in a loose exegetical translation to highlight the narrative: “Indeed We offered the Trust to
the heavens, the earth and the mountains, but they refused to assume it, fearing it; but Man as-
sumed it—indeed he is an ignorant tyrant—in order that God may [exercise His right to] torment
the hypocrites [men and women] and polytheists [men and women]; and that God [exercise His
right to] relent mercifully to the believing men and women. And God was [even before the crea-
tion of Man] Ever-Forgiving, Merciful” (emphasis added to highlight narrative). See FEISAL AB-
DUL RAUF, ISLAM: A SEARCH FOR MEANING 54 (1996).
123. This is consistent with the American Declaration of Independence’s statement that all of
humanity has been “endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights.” THE DECLARATION
OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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such a guaranteeing cause, they cannot coherently be deemed either univer-
sal or inalienable.
Muslim jurists predominantly operated in the Arabic verb-based para-
digm, and developed a system of valuation of actions: the obligatory, rec-
ommended, permitted, disliked-but-allowable, and forbidden actions. They
extracted from the “raw data” of Divine commandments in the Qur’an and
as adumbrated by the Prophet a set of obligatory—prescribed and prohib-
ited—actions (the fara’id) whose corollary was a set of rights, both of God
and of Man. Since then, Muslim thinkers have continually insisted that
rights flow out of duties and obligations,124 but need to make their case
clearer as to why that is so.
124. Moosa points out several instances of this:
One is A.K. Brohi, who remarks that “the believer has only obligations or duties towards
God since he is called upon to obey the Divine Law, and such human rights as he is made to
acknowledge stem from his primary duty to obey God. Yet paradoxically, in these duties lie all
the rights and freedoms.” Moosa, Dilemma, supra note 1, at 198 (emphasis added). In other
words, Brohi implicitly asserts the primacy of the verb-based paradigm in Shari’a, i.e., mutual
duties and obligations between God and Man, and between Man and fellow-Man. In this para-
digm, as we have shown above, human rights as “things possessed” are not ontologically indepen-
dent, but are contingent entities, ontologically dependent on the actions between ontologically real
players; i.e., rights are personifications of verbs and therefore emanate from a specific cluster of
duties or responsibilities between men. Struggling to link these paradigmatic notions leads him to
add that “[m]an acknowledges the rights of his fellow men because this is a duty imposed on him
by the religious law to obey God and the Prophet and those who are constituted as authority to
conduct the affairs of state.” Id. (emphasis added). Italics in this and following quotes are mine,
used to highlight importance of verbs and verbal nouns.
Another is Seyyed Hossein Nasr, who comments that
[h]uman rights are, according to the Shari’ah, a consequence of human obligations and
not their antecedent. We possess certain obligations towards God, nature, and other
humans, all of which are delineated by the Shari’ah. As a result of fulfilling these obli-
gations we gain certain rights and freedoms which are again outlined by the Divine Law.
Those who do not fulfil [sic] these obligations have no legitimate rights, and any claims
of freedom that they make upon the environment or society is illegitimate and a usurpa-
tion of what does not belong to them, in the same way that those persons who refuse to
recognise [sic] their theomorphic nature and act accordingly are only ‘accidentally’
human and are usurping the human state which by definition implies centrality and
Divine vicegerency.
SEYYED HOSSEIN NASR, ISLAMIC LIFE AND THOUGHT 18 (2001) (quoted in part in Moosa, Di-
lemma, supra note 1, at 199).
Nasr here has conflated a number of points. First he implicitly suggests that rights are onto-
logically dependent on action. In the worldly sense he is speaking of those who violate certain
prescriptions: for example, a murderer would forfeit his right to life under Sharia law. In the
context of the moral pro-actions of an individual, Nasr is referring to human rights in the absolute
metaphysical sense: the point of view of human beings’ eschatological rights on Judgment Day,
whose Judge is only God. The Qur’an and Sunnah make it explicitly clear that this area of judg-
ment belongs to God alone, whose right to judge on, no human being or human court may usurp.
Qur’an 18:104–105 states that those whose efforts are null although they think they are doing
good are those who disbelieve in the messages of their Lord and of meeting Him; their works are
vain—therefore, “We shall not set up a balance for them [to weigh their actions] on the day of
Resurrection.”
The Qur’an explicitly paints a very different order between that of earth and that of heaven,
and that the “game of life” that God has ordained for humankind, out of which flows a set of
human obligations, is expected to be protected by Qur’anically compliant laws on earth, which has
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Even the UIDHR explicitly states that in “terms of our primeval cove-
nant with God our duties and obligations have priority over our rights,”125
leading Moosa to suggest that the UIDHR may have been more appropri-
ately named the “Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Duties.”126 Here
Moosa makes a key suggestion. If in fact the Islamic paradigm is duty-
based, then the first step is to generate a Universal Declaration of Sharia-
Required Human Duties that demonstrably flows out of Islamic legal, tex-
tual, and other sources. Mapping these into their correlative rights would
give us a truly Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights. Comparing
that to the UDHR would then be a more objective comparison between the
Western and Islamic components of these rights.
This is what the UIDHR either implicitly attempted or explicitly ig-
nored (depending on whether one’s point of view is charitable or not). To
the reader, the UIDHR feels much like the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights at the beginning; then it was projected onto and compared with the
“verbal sources” of commands and prohibitions in the Qur’an and Sunni
sources of Hadith. Those that matched were then re-stated in a human rights
paradigm. While this was a valuable exercise, it needs to be subjected to a
more rigorous methodology, and expanded to include Shia sources of
Hadith.
Those who have chosen to short-circuit or ignore the paradigm issue
are less concerned about such mental peregrinations, and prefer to focus on
the ends or outcomes of both the Islamic ethic and the secular ethic on what
a notion of the common good must mean. The liberal Tunisian Islamist
ideologue Rashid al-Ghannushi is among those who fall into this category.
By following a purely ethical standpoint, he finds it easy to assert:
major implications for an earthly jurisprudence. We believe that is where a potential pitfall lies
that has led Muslims to have gone wrong in their treatment of other religious minorities. After the
death of the Prophet, and as the Islamic empire expanded, some pre-Islamic (jahili) notions incon-
sistent with the Qur’anically mandated rules of societal conduct crept back into society. In all
societies (even the United States), treason earned a capital punishment. The distinction between
taking a position differing from that of the rulers in matters of religion purely as a matter of
freedom of thought, (i.e., without switching political allegiance) and doing so in a context where it
necessarily means that one’s political allegiance became allied with an enemy (thus an act of
political treason) is often unclear to the reader of history, and often as well to those in power. This
distinction needs to be made however, between Islamic theology and Islamic history where rulers
in some instances lost this distinction. One example where the State’s role as “judging on behalf
of God” vis-a`-vis people’s religious beliefs peaked (whether towards non-Muslims regarding their
religion or to Muslims regarding some of their ideas) was that of the Caliphate of the Abbasid al-
Ma’mun (who ruled from 196/812 to 223/838). The Qur’anically mandated Divine intent regard-
ing how we rule ourselves on earth, giving humanity the right to freedom of religious conscience
as the Divine intent for this “game of life” and for which God will judge us on how we played it in
the hereafter, was abridged. People have confused human obligations towards society with an
attempt to impose their eschatological views on others, thus “depriving God” of His “sole and
exclusive right”—or anticipating Him in the exercise of His right—to judgment on Judgment Day.
125. UIDHR, supra note 73, at pmbl. para. f (emphasis added).
126. Moosa, Dilemma, supra note 1, at 197 (emphasis added).
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A comparison between the principles of human rights in Islam
and the modern human rights charters discloses that there is a
large area of commonality, with few exceptions, which is the rea-
son why the universal declaration of human rights, for example—
in its general thrust—is so widely received by the Muslim who
has a good understanding of his religion.127
As I shall detail in the next section, articulations of human rights, like
those found in the 1776 American Declaration of Independence—and in
subsequent human rights declarations, such as the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights—histori-
cally arose as a reaction to great suffering and experiences of legal and
moral wrongs, thus validating the perspective of Muslim jurists on the etiol-
ogy of rights as arising out of a failure in performing a morally contractual
duty.128 Again, the philosophical underpinnings of the American Declara-
tion’s unalienable rights to “Life, Liberty and pursuit of Happiness” were
based on a metaphysical narrative that—in the eyes of its authors—came
out of “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God.”129 Although Christian,
they were not Christian in the narrowest and most parochial sense of the
word, but rather Christian formulations in the broadest sense, and held a
perspective that expressed the supra-religious metaphysics of an Abrahamic
religious ethic that embraces within its orbit the Jewish and Islamic
worldviews.130
Hence, placing an Islamic list of human duties into a rights-holders
framework, and within a governmental powers doctrine could result in ho-
meomorphic Islamic human rights “flowing out of the Islamic woodwork”
that would overlap with much, if not most of the universal declaration of
human rights. Hermeneutics, apologetics, and the tools of modern scholar-
ship notwithstanding, most Muslim scholars (such as Moosa and Ghan-
nushi) would agree that the majority of Muslims intuitively recognize the
127. Quoted in id. at 200.
128. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and the European Convention on
Human Rights in 1953 came about as a result of the massive suffering Europe and the West
(including the United States and the Soviet Union) underwent during the period from the Great
Depression in 1929 through the end of World War II. During this time the application of technol-
ogy to the advancement of war and abuses resulted in the scourges of Nazism, Fascism, and the
Holocaust. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS: CULTURAL AND IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note
26, at chs. 1–3.
We may also note that these human rights declarations, in a general sense, “came out” of an
attempt to attenuate the ravages of a rampant capitalism and an expansion of state powers as a
result of the industrial revolution, and the ability of technology to leverage state power at the
expense of the common man.
129. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1–2 (U.S. 1776).
130. By Abrahamic ethic, we mean the belief in a strict monotheism of a personal providential
God who commanded humanity with the two major commandments common to the Abrahamic
faith traditions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam: to love God with all the components of one’s
being (heart, mind, soul, and physical strength), and to love one’s neighbors (fellow human be-
ings) as oneself. See RAUF, WHAT’S RIGHT WITH ISLAM, supra note 1, at 14–18.
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universal declaration of human rights as consistent and positively reso-
nating with their emotional, intellectual, and spiritual understanding of their
religion; such intuition flowing out of the Qur’anic idea of right religion as
being din al-fitrah.
IV. HOW THE AMERICAN DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE,
CONSTITUTION AND BILL OF RIGHTS ARE CONSISTENT
WITH ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE
Such an intuitively religious approach to human rights discourse arises
out of the American Declaration of Independence (declared on July 4, 1776)
and subsequent Bill of Rights (comprising ten amendments ratified in De-
cember 1791) to the Constitution (itself signed in September 1787 and rati-
fied by the states soon thereafter). Highlighting the context and narrative
surrounding the Declaration reveals strong resonances with classical Is-
lamic legal thought: First, El Fadl’s point above, namely that Muslim jurists
“thought of individual rights as arising from a legal cause brought about by
the suffering of a legal wrong” and that “[a] person does not possess a right
until he or she has been wronged” is in fact the historical contextual narra-
tive, and is therefore arguably the ontological and legal cause of the rights
enumerated in the American Declaration.
The Declaration devotes more than four times as much space to
enumerating the “long train of abuses and usurpations”131 than to expres-
sing the rights. Twenty-seven paragraphs (some of which are just clauses)
scream pleadingly at the reader, detailing “a history of repeated injuries and
usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute tyr-
anny”132 by the King of Great Britain upon the American colonies. Among
the wrongs committed were his having “plundered our seas, ravaged our
coasts, burnt our towns, and destroyed the lives of our people,”133 mock
trials to protect his armies from punishment for murders committed, and
having made “judges dependent on his will alone.”134 The King was “deaf
to the voice of justice,”135 so the American states had to “acquiesce in the
necessity” of announcing their separation, a “necessity which constrain[ed]
them to alter their former systems of government.”136
The American Declaration’s “unalienable rights” did not come out of
thin air: the Sharia legal cause for expressing rights as arising from legal
causes brought about by the suffering of a legal wrong is what historically
midwived the Declaration. The long opening line of the Declaration makes
this very clear:
131. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 3 (U.S. 1776).
132. Id. at para. 4.
133. Id. at para. 28.
134. Id. at para. 13.
135. Id. at para. 4.
136. Id. at para. 33.
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When in the Course of human Events, it becomes necessary for
one People to dissolve the Political Bands which have connected
them with another, and to assume among the Powers of the Earth,
the separate and equal Station to which the Laws of Nature and of
Nature’s God entitle them, a decent Respect to the Opinions of
Mankind requires that they should declare the causes which im-
pel them to the Separation.137
The Declaration’s authors, feeling that they were required to declare
(before the Court of Public Opinion) the causes which impelled them to the
separation, proceeded—in response to and arising from the legal cause
brought about by the suffering of more than two dozen legal wrongs—to
enumerate and claim the unalienable rights that had been infringed; thus,
We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are
created equal,138 that they are endowed by their Creator with cer-
tain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and
the Pursuit of Happiness.139
The second point of similarity with Islamic legal thought is that the
authors of the American Declaration held that these rights flowed out of a
God-centered metaphysical world view and ethic. Roger Pilon, senior fel-
low and director of Cato’s Center for Constitutional Studies, points out that
“perhaps the most important line in the document [is]: ‘We hold these
Truths to be self-evident.’”140 These truths, he adds, ground the Declaration
in reason, and
invoke the long tradition of natural law, which holds that there is
a “higher law” of right and wrong from which to derive human
law and against which to criticize that law at any time. It is not
political will, then, but moral reasoning, accessible to all, that is
the foundation of our political system.141
Replace “higher law” in this sentence with “Sharia law”—with the concom-
itant understanding of Shatibi that the meta-purpose of Sharia law is fur-
thering the interests of humankind—and one gets precisely the classical
Islamic viewpoint.
Unlike the present-day position held by many contemporary Wes-
terners who regard human rights as emanating from a purely secular
137. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added).
138. See DONNELLY, supra note 83, on what is intended by human equality. We must note
however that although the original understanding that the authors intended came out of a religious
moral viewpoint, historically they did not in practice treat other races and genders equally for two
more centuries.
139. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
140. Roger Pilon, Preface to THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1, 2 (Cato Inst. 2002). The objective of reasoning, or the object
of human intellect, is truth; thus, the objective of moral reasoning is moral truth. And the founders
regarded these rights, emerging from their experience of a “long train of abuses and usurpations,”
as moral truths.
141. Id. at 2–3.
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worldview devoid of any religiosity, the Declaration’s authors clearly em-
braced a religious worldview. The common denominator of their belief was
a supra-religious Deist and moral worldview that included the Christian
moral ethic based on the second Abrahamic commandment of loving one’s
neighbor as oneself, and which granted all citizens the freedom to express
the first commandment (loving God with all one’s mind, heart, soul, and
strength) according to their individual preferential mode of expressing this
love.142
This is evident from the opening lines of the Declaration that entitle
the wronged people to assume the rights of equality, which the “Laws of
Nature and of Nature’s God” entitles them to assume, namely that all men
are created equal,143 that their Creator endowed them with certain unalien-
able rights, and that those rights include “life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness.” The phrase “Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God” makes it
clear that this Declaration regards its “self-evident truths” as not only ema-
nating from the long tradition of natural law, but it also places (if not
equates) natural law as being something that is embraced by and flowing
from “the Laws of Nature’s God,” and thus reveals an intuitive sense of
Divine Law.144
Muslims call this intuitive sense of religiosity din al-fitrah, which
means natural law (or natural religion, the word din meaning both religion
and law in Arabic) and is the core definition of Islam and of “right law or
142. But when the history of the legal causes that brought these rights into being is erased
from a people’s popular collective memory, and it becomes politically correct to be sacrilegious, it
becomes understandable—though not excusable—why many reject the notion that human rights
evolved within the Western, and specifically American, scene out of a deep religious heritage. The
authoritarian and despotic political contexts of many Muslim societies have created the political
and psychological contexts from which to establish an Islamic Declaration of Human Rights. But
because the UIDHR, unlike the American Declaration, does not list its “legal parentage” (i.e., its
legal causes of wrongs committed against Muslim peoples), this has in part contributed to the
charge that it is the hermeneutically “illegitimate child” sired of a Westernized me-too
apologetics.
143. Human equality flows from the Abrahamic faiths’ common assertion that humankind was
created from one male and one female [QUR’AN 49:13; Genesis 1:27], thus are all equally brothers
and sisters. Therefore, there can be no classes or castes among humankind. It is this notion of
human equality that is expressed in the American Declaration of Independence, and not that all
human beings are equal in God-given talent.
144. In 1775, a year before the American Revolution began, Alexander Hamilton wrote, “The
sacred rights of mankind are not to be rummaged for among old parchments or musty records.
They are written, as with a sunbeam, in the whole volume of human nature, by the hand of
Divinity itself, and can never be erased or obscured by mortal power.” The Farmer Refuted (1775),
in AMERICAN STATE PAPERS 123, quoted in FORREST CHURCH, THE AMERICAN CREED 32 (2002)
(emphasis added). Almost fifty years later, in 1824, Thomas Jefferson noted in reminiscing about
the drafting of the Declaration of Independence, “We had no occasion to search into musty
records, to hunt up royal parchments, or to investigate the laws and institutions of a semi-barba-
rous ancestry. We appealed to those of nature, and found them engraved on our hearts.” Thomas
Jefferson, letter to John Hambden Pleassants, April 19, 1824, quoted in CHURCH, supra, at 33.
500 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 7:3
right religion” (din al-haq).145 The authors of the American Declaration use
theistic language by calling human rights the “sacred rights of mankind”
written by the hand of Divinity.146 Whatever might arguably have been the
result of the Enlightenment in banishing religion—and specifically Christi-
anity—from the boardrooms of European society, American political “sec-
ularity” defined itself not as anti-religiosity but as a distinct pro-religiosity
based on the ethics and metaphysics of a divine and providential theistic
religiosity, de-linked from Christian liturgy that allowed originally only
Protestant and non-Catholic “Christian religions,” but later expanded to
other varieties of Christian religious expression as part of the American
societal contract. The contemporary need in the United States is to recog-
nize the Islamic metaphysical view as consistent with this.
The third point of similarity with Islamic legal thought is the rights
themselves, consistent with the opinions of Muslim jurists who said that the
meta-purpose or meta-intent of Sharia is maslaha, i.e., the moral common
good and best interests of the people articulated within a context of moral
reasoning that is delimited by moral truth, and from which all man-made
laws must be derived and against which they are criticized. This is true not
only in the derivation of laws but also in the application of laws; otherwise,
as I pointed earlier, the mechanisms of the law may come to be used to
thwart the intentions of the law.
The phrasing “the Creator has endowed humankind with certain
rights” (that they can claim against other players) is the precise equivalent
and corollary of saying “Divine Law requires certain players [(the duty-
bearers)] to fulfill certain obligations towards others [(the rights-
holders)].”147
The Qur’anic narrative of the meaning of man describes man as cre-
ated by God for the purpose of worshipping and glorifying God.148 Yet man
was given freewill to either choose or reject God, to live a life consistent
with this choice, and to find happiness in pursuing the purposes for which
God had given him the natural ability, talent, and inclination.149 The
145. The Qur’an states that monotheism and its social concomitants, as true or right religious-
ness, were embedded by God in human nature as part of human conscience and that God com-
manded humanity to honor it: “So set thou thy face steadily and truly [literally, hanif-ly] to the
Faith [fitrah]: (Establish) God’s handiwork according to the pattern on which He has made man-
kind: No change (let there be) in the work (wrought) by God: that is the standard Religion: but
most among mankind understand not.” QUR’AN 30:30. The idea of this verse is that any person
who listens to his or her heart and conscience would recognize that God is One, that humanity is
one family, that humans should be free, and should treat each other fairly and with justice.
146. See generally THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
147. Id.
148. “I have only created Jinns and men, that they may serve Me. No Sustenance do I require
of them, nor do I require that they should feed Me.” QUR’AN 51:56–57.
149. This is given by verses like 18:29, which reads: “Say, ‘The Truth is from your Lord’: let
him who will, believe, and let him who will, reject (it)” QUR’AN 18:29 (emphasis added). This is
in conjunction with verse 2:256, which states, “Let there be no compulsion in religion,” and 5:51,
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Qur’anic picture that this portrays is that the divine plan for human life on
earth requires human free will, and requires divine help in achieving its
acceptance or rejection of God.150 Since part of the divine plan is to grant
human beings the space to accept or reject God and to do so in a manner of
their choosing, human configuration of society also must allow this space.
Not to do so would thwart the divine will and reduce humanity’s degrees of
human freedom. This is the primary Qur’anic context of human liberty, and
is a right implicit in the phrasing “liberty” as the over-arching inalienable
right after “life.”
The Declaration’s final paragraph appeals “to the Supreme Judge of
the World for the Rectitude of our Intentions,” and concludes with the
words, “And for the support of this Declaration, with a firm Reliance on the
Protection of divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our
Lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor.”151 In other words, the Foun-
ders, in a manner that resonates and is consonant with the beliefs of devout
Muslims, intended to establish America as a religious God-believing soci-
ety and nation, a moral society whose ethics emanate from and reflect the
underlying transcendent unity (and core) of religious beliefs of the
Abrahamic Ethic.
A. On the Form of Government that Could Protect Human Rights
A careful reading of the American Constitution and its amendments
sounds like an employment contract between the people (as employers) and
those elected to government (as employees). It indicates a deep solicitous-
ness that the people’s representatives and government officials be beholden
solely to the American people, and not to other U.S. government officials,
nor to any foreign or domestic state. The Constitution is the means by
which the people can retain power over government.
The Declaration was made in the context of securing individual human
rights against overbearing and tyrannical rulers (read: securing that the gov-
ernment officials fulfilled their divinely ordained duties towards the citi-
zens). The Founders recognized that a mere declaration of rights was
insufficient; they needed to address the issue of power, and therefore paid
very careful attention to the structure of government, realizing that its pow-
ers had to be carefully divided and severely restrained. They, therefore,
explain:
which informs us that “If God had so willed, He would have made you a single People, but (His
Plan is) to test you in what He hath given you: so strive as in a race in all virtues. The goal of you
all is to God; it is He that will show you the truth of the matters in which ye dispute.”
150. Qur’anic verses like 14:4 and 5:48 (respectively) reveal: “Now God misguides those
whom He pleases and guides whom He pleases: and He is Exalted in Power, full of Wisdom” and
“If God had willed, he would have made you a single nation, but He misguides whomever wills
[or whomever He wills—both readings are valid] and guides whomever wills [or whomever He
wills]. And you will surely be questioned about what you were doing.”
151. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added).
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That to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among
Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Gov-
erned, that whenever any Form of Government becomes destruc-
tive of these Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to
abolish it,152 and to institute new Government, laying its Founda-
tions on such Principles, and organizing its Powers in such Form,
as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and
Happiness.153
This passage points out that the government’s overriding purpose—its
end—is to secure the human rights of its citizens (“men” who have already
been declared equal, thus abolishing any class structures that posit human
inequality). In addition, the powers the government may need to secure its
citizens’ rights (the ends) must be derived from the citizens’ consent if the
powers are to be just.154
As Pilon comments, “Government is thus twice limited: by its end
[i.e., it is obliged to protect our God-given rights], which any of us would
have a right to pursue were there no government; and by its means, which
require our consent.”155 This is where the American Declaration made a
major contribution to political thought; defining both an ends-driven defini-
tion of right governance, and a means that would ensure that the ends are
achieved.156
The Founders, therefore, structured the powers of government in a way
that to them they appeared best suited to prevent an abuse of their rights.
“Having recently overthrown oppressive English rule [in the Revolutionary
War], they were not about to re-impose oppressive government on them-
selves . . . . Their basic task,” Pilon adds, “was to devise a government . . .
strong enough to secure [the expressed] rights against domestic and foreign
oppression, yet not so powerful or extensive as to be oppressive itself.”157
Thus, they established a notion of limited government, granting government
specific authorized powers, and “then checked and balanced those powers
through a series of extraordinarily thoughtful measures.”158
152. Note the language of the Declaration, that “the Right of the People to alter or to abolish”
the government occurs when the “Government becomes destructive of these Ends.” What Mus-
lims had not achieved in their 1400-year history was to effect such a change of government when
it had become destructive of its ends from the point of view of Islamic principles of justice. This
is, in our times, what Muslims dearly want to institute.
153. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
154. Pilon, supra note 140, at 3.
155. Id. (emphasis added).
156. This is what we hope the Sharia Index Project will do: establish both an ends-driven
definition of Islamic governance, and determine which means have best achieved such ends.
157. Pilon, supra note 140, at 4.
158. Id.
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They “intended the doctrine of enumerated powers to be our principal
defense against overweening government.”159 The government could hardly
abuse a power that it did not have in the first place.
But they provided other defenses as well. In addition to dividing power
between national and state governments, leaving most power with the states
or with the people, they separated powers among the three branches of the
national government—legislative, executive, and judicial—and devised a
series of checks and balances to further restrain these powers.160
The Preamble to the Constitution sets forth a number of basic princi-
ples, and further reminds the reader of the right of individual human free
will through its emphasis on liberty:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more per-
fect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide
for the common defence, promote the general Welfare and secure
the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain
and establish this Constitution for the United States of
America.161
“We the People” serves to remind government officials that all power
comes from the people; “to ourselves and our posterity” reminds govern-
ment that it exists not only to act in the best interests of its generation, but
also for the sake of succeeding generations of Americans.
The government received only strictly limited and enumerated powers
to exercise on the people’s behalf, which is expressed in the first line of
Article I of the Constitution: “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate
and House of Representatives.”162 Thereby the people established a means
of control via their elected senators and congresspeople to maintain their
power over government. The first seven sections of Article I describe in
great detail the elections of senators and congresspeople, the times, fre-
quency, places, and manners of holding their elections, the compensation
they may receive, and the powers they may exercise. That the people
“herein granted” only limited legislative powers is additionally borne out by
the enumeration of those powers in Section 8. Knowing that titles created
classes of people in other societies (e.g., the noble classes), Section 9
sought to pre-empt any possibility of that happening in America. The draft-
ers prohibited senators and congresspeople from being subjected to influ-
159. Id. at 6.
160. Id. (“Within the bounds of its enumerated powers, for example, Congress may enact
legislation; but the [elected] president has a power to veto such legislation, which Congress may
then override only by a supermajority vote. Likewise, in deciding cases or controversies before
them, the courts may exercise the judicial power by reviewing the actions of the other two
branches to ensure that they do not exceed the limits imposed by the Constitution . . . but the
president and Congress determine who shall sit on the federal courts.”).
161. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
162. U.S. CONST. art. I, §1.
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ence by governmental power by prohibiting them from receiving any titles
from the government, including from domestic or foreign states. Allowing
titles would have diluted the power people retained over their senators and
congresspeople. Section 9 therefore ends with the statement, “No Title of
Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no Person holding any
Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Con-
gress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind
whatever, from any King, Prince or foreign State.”163
Article II of the Constitution turns to the powers of the President,
granting him executive power. It goes into his election, including how
often, the term,164 and the various powers granted to the office of the Presi-
dency. It also addresses the President’s compensation, and that he “shall not
receive within that Period [of his term] any other Emolument from the
United States, or any of them.”165 To ensure his loyalty to the terms of the
Constitution, Section 1 of Article II adds that,
Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the
following Oath or Affirmation:—“I do solemnly swear (or affirm)
that I will faithfully execute the Office of the President of the
United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect
and defend the Constitution of the United States.”166
Article III then turns to the judicial powers granted to the U.S. Su-
preme Court and federal court system, their duties and the compensation of
judges.
The Constitution was drafted in 1787—eleven years after the Declara-
tion was made and the new nation won its independence from the British on
the battlefield. And yet, in spite of the language of the founding documents
and the new government, the drafters were still concerned that the new gov-
ernment might abuse its powers. Therefore, to the end of allaying this fear,
in 1789 Congress transmitted to the state legislatures twelve proposed
amendments, ten of which were adopted and became known as the Bill of
Rights.
The preamble to the Bill of Rights shows how the founders attempted
to further preempt the possibility of government abusing its powers and
revealed their concern and uncertainty that their newly established govern-
ment might in fact become destructive of its proper ends:
The Conventions of a number of the States, having at the time of
their adopting the Constitution, expressed a desire, in order to
prevent misconstruction or abuse of its powers, that further de-
163. U.S. CONST. art. I, §9, cl. 7.
164. The term was limited by the Twenty-second Amendment to a maximum of two terms,
again to limit the power of the president after Franklin Roosevelt won four elections, gaining too
much power in the process.
165. U.S. CONST. art. II, §1, cl. 7.
166. U.S. CONST. art. II, §1, cl. 9.
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claratory and restrictive clauses should be added: And as ex-
tending the ground of public confidence in the Government, will
best ensure the beneficent ends167 of its institution.168
The last two of the original ten amendments were added for greater
caution. No bill could list all rights, so the drafters added the Ninth Amend-
ment as a catchall and reminder clause: “The enumeration in the Constitu-
tion of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people.”169 This also means that the government, in the exe-
cution of its duties in accordance with the rights granted to it by the people,
may not use the given right as an argument to deny or disparage other rights
retained by the people; thus, the people’s rights trumped those of the gov-
ernment, and not the other way around.
Pilon points out that this concept
is reiterated, as if for emphasis, in the Tenth Amendment, the fi-
nal member of the Bill of Rights that was drafted in 1789, then
added, after ratification, in 1791: “The powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”170
To recapitulate, only certain powers were delegated or granted by the peo-
ple to the government, and which were then enumerated in the Constitution.
The rest were reserved to the states—or to the people, never having been
granted to either level of government.171
Here, it should be pointed out that the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights (the Amendments) speak of duties, things that each of Congress, the
President and the Judiciary may or may not do.172 This shows that in ad-
dressing the institutions of power, and specifically government, the protec-
tion of rights can only be effectively established by enumerating the do’s
and don’ts, the list of duties and limitations on action of the power-bearing
duty-bearers toward the rights-holders. This is consistent with and explains
why, in the Islamic frame of reference, the focus is on duties directed to-
ward the duty-bearers; for if they fulfill their duty, human rights will be
automatically addressed. It also shows that it is not possible to ensure
human rights by just a declaration of rights alone; a simultaneous declara-
167. Note again how a Bill of “Rights” emerges out of a fear of the potential abuse of power.
168. BILL OF RIGHTS, pmbl.
169. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
170. Pilon, supra note 140, at 4–5.
171. Id.
172. For example, the First Amendment (or the first “right” of the Bill of Rights)—which
includes the phrase known as the “establishment clause” and is the basis of the government not
establishing a state religion—reads, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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tion of duties upon those who are in the positions of power is necessary to
ensure the protection of any human right.
Even then, unless we can exercise power over those who exercise it on
our behalf, the danger of abuse still exists; for “[i]n the end,” as Pilon points
out,
no constitution can be self-enforcing. Government officials must
respect their oaths to uphold the Constitution; and we the people
must be vigilant in seeing that they do. The Founders drafted an
extraordinarily thoughtful plan of government, but it is up to us,
to each generation, to preserve and protect it for ourselves and for
future generations. The Constitution will live only if it is alive in
the hearts and minds of the American people. That, perhaps, is the
most enduring lesson of our experiment in ordered liberty.173
B. The American Democracy’s Creed, and the Constitutional Limits to
the Government’s Sovereignty
The purpose of the founding of the United States was not only to es-
tablish a democracy, but to establish a religious democracy, the Biblical
“City on the Hill,” a land where religious freedoms prevailed. The envi-
sioned society secured both freedom of religion for those who wanted to
practice their religion freely, and freedom from religion for those who
wished to practice no religion at all. In this society, one was free to be an
atheist if one chose to be, but no belief was imposed, including atheism,
upon all of society. Yet the society would not behave in a manner that
violated the norms of ethics and goodness—which were understood to orig-
inate from a religious moral viewpoint.
The second greatest commandment of the Abrahamic Ethic, namely to
love one’s fellow human being as oneself, was in essence de-linked from
the first commandment in the sense that the choice of whether one wanted
to love the One God the Lord, and how one chose to express that love
liturgically, was left up to the individual. The Founders, however, perceived
the morality of the second commandment as flowing from the first. In his
farewell address, George Washington summed up the role of religion in
America:
Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosper-
ity, Religion and morality are indispensable supports. In vain
would that man claim the tribute of Patriotism, who should labor
to subvert these great Pillars of human happiness, these firmest
props of the duties of Men and citizens . . . . And let us with
caution indulge the supposition, that morality can be maintained
without religion. Whatever may be conceded to the influence of
refined education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and expe-
rience both forbid us to expect that National morality can prevail
173. Pilon, supra note 140, at 7.
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in exclusion of religious principle . . . . Cultivate peace and har-
mony with all. Religion and morality enjoin this conduct; and can
it be that good policy does not equally enjoin it? It will be worthy
of a free, enlightened, and at no distant period, a great Nation to
give to mankind the magnanimous and too novel example of a
People always guided by an exalted justice and benevolence.174
The moral boundary established by the Declaration is essential to con-
textualize the view of sovereignty. The Declaration points out that we insti-
tute government in order that it may fulfill its ends, namely its divinely
mandated obligations to protect its citizens’ inalienable rights that were en-
dowed to us by the Creator. But “whenever any Form of Government be-
comes destructive of these Ends,” i.e., it does not fulfill its divinely
mandated obligations, “it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it,
and to institute new Government,” and if need be re-organize its powers in
such a way that it will protect its citizens’ rights and discharge the God-
given obligations.175 (Note here, as Muslim jurists averred, the right “ap-
pears” and is “exercised” at the point of dereliction of duty, when the obli-
gation is unfulfilled, which occurs when the “Government becomes
destructive of these Ends.”)
When an American (or any other) government discharges its (God-
given) ends (i.e., God-given obligations), it has moral authority; i.e., it de-
rives its moral authority from God. If, however, the government has not
discharged its God-given obligations, it has lost its moral authority and
legitimacy.
Writing in 2002, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia asserts that
“[t]he mistaken tendency to believe that a democratic government, being
nothing more than the composite will of its individual citizens, has no more
moral power or authority than they do as individuals has adverse effects in
other areas as well.”176 Scalia recommends that
the reaction of people of faith to this tendency of democracy to
obscure the divine authority behind government should not be
resignation to it, but the resolution to combat it as effectively as
possible. We have done that in this country (and continental Eu-
rope has not) by preserving in our public life many visible re-
minders that—in the words of a Supreme Court opinion from the
1940s—“we are a religious people, whose institutions presuppose
a Supreme Being.” These reminders include: “In God we trust”
on our coins, “one nation, under God” in our Pledge of Alle-
giance, the opening of sessions of our legislatures with a prayer,
the opening of sessions of my Court with “God save the United
States and this Honorable Court,” annual Thanksgiving proclama-
174. CHURCH, supra note 144, at 138–39 (emphasis added).
175. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
176. Antonin Scalia, God’s Justice and Ours, 123 FIRST THINGS 17, 19 (2002), available at
http://www.firstthings.com/article/2007/01/gods-justice-and-ours-32.
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tions issued by our President at the direction of Congress, and
constant invocations of divine support in the speeches of our po-
litical leaders, which often conclude, “God bless America.”177
American government is therefore theistic democracy, not atheistic de-
mocracy. The “tendency of democracy to obscure the divine authority be-
hind government” that Scalia warns of is subtle.178 By obscuring the
boundary of divine authority in the eyes of many, they then equate democ-
racy to an absolute sovereignty of its nation’s citizens. If we bear in mind
that it is possible to have any combination of beliefs and forms of govern-
ment,179 as Scalia implicitly suggests, then our reaction as “people of faith
to this tendency of democracy to obscure the divine authority behind gov-
ernment should not be resignation to it, but the resolution to combat it as
effectively as possible.”180
Theistic democracy delimits governance by, and subjects it to, Divine
and thus moral law. The Courts are, and have to be, the guardians and inter-
preters of this law in any form of governance. This holds as true for theistic
democracies as it was for theistic monarchies. As a theistic democracy, the
American Declaration in fact principally expresses the values and structures
of Islamic legal thought, albeit in a non-parochially Islamic fashion; how-
ever, where it has gone further is in articulating the form of governance
needed to assure achievement of its ends.
CONCLUSION
We have now identified several of the key threads involved in estab-
lishing an Islamic human rights doctrine, and, necessarily, compared them
to the American Bill of Rights, from which we believe the UDHR flowed.
They include the following:
Islamic law regards a right held by a right-holder as the ontological
corollary of a duty mandated upon a duty-holder; the need to exercise the
right “arises” at the time of dereliction of duty by the duty-bearer, and as
part of a contractual narrative into which both parties freely entered.
Islamic law also regards the human rights-duties narrative as emanat-
ing from a covenantal relationship between God and Man that Man freely
accepted of God; i.e., to be God’s vicegerent or ambassador on earth. This
177. Id. at 19–20.
178. Id. at 19.
179. This error occurs because many presume an equivalence between religious beliefs and
forms of governance. It is possible to have an atheistic monarchy or an atheistic republic. Thus, it
is possible to have an atheistic democracy, an atheistic socialism, and an atheistic fascism. Analo-
gously, it is also possible to have a theistic monarchy or republic, a theistic democracy, a theistic
socialism, and a theistic fascism. Thus, it is also possible to have a Jewish, Christian, or Islamic
monarchy or republic; a Jewish, Christian, or Islamic democracy; a Jewish, Christian, or Islamic
socialism; or a Jewish, Christian, or Islamic fascism. Conflating atheism with democracy is false
historically and intellectually.
180. Scalia, supra note 176, at 19 (emphasis added).
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provides the contractual narrative, in which Man is a free agent possessing
free will, whose free will allows him the option to violate this contract.
From the violation of this contract comes the idea of sin and violation of
what is morally right. Fulfillment of this contract defines that which is mor-
ally correct.
The American Declaration’s existential and metaphysical viewpoint is
identical to the Islamic in that it:
• Posits a God-Man relationship and narrative out of which comes a
list of mutual duties and corollary rights. The moral duty toward
God is to encourage religion for the well-being of society. The com-
mand to love and adore God to their utmost, in the manner of their
choice, and to love their fellow human beings as they love them-
selves, is one of two major commandments common to the three
Abrahamic faiths: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.
• Because all of humanity is considered to have been created from one
original couple, this Abrahamic Ethic regards all humanity as “sib-
lings”—thus equal. From this comes the moral “self-evident” truth
of human equality.
• That all of humanity has moral free will, defined as the option to
disobey God and commit sin; thus, the duty of the power structure is
to protect human liberty in order that humans may exercise their free
will, and allow humans the privilege of exercising their free will in a
manner that does not prevent others within the society from exercis-
ing their free will. Implicit in this idea is that a power structure or
system of rule that denies human liberty thwarts the Divine intent
expected of Man.
The historic event of the American Declaration of rights is consistent
with the Islamic juridical idea that a right arises when the duty-bearer vio-
lates his obligations. The specific legal and moral causes that led to the
declaration of inalienable rights were the “long train of abuses”181 by the
English king towards the American colonies. Parallel to this was the his-
toric event of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (as well as the
subsequent European Convention on Human Rights). Both were caused by
a three decades-long period of enormous human suffering in Europe. From
1914 through 1945, the technological advances in warfare and new post-
Industrial Revolution socio-economic disruptions in human relations pre-
cipitated the First World War, followed a decade later by a lengthy eco-
nomic depression that witnessed starvation and human suffering on a
historically unprecedented scale, loss of civilian and military human life of
unprecedented proportion in the Second World War, genocide of Jews, gyp-
sies, and others deemed racially impure by the fascist Nazi regime (the Hol-
181. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 3 (U.S. 1776).
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ocaust), and the invention of weapons of mass destruction capable of
destroying the whole human race.
The historic contribution of the American Constitution and its Amend-
ments (the Bill of Rights) was to establish a form of government (a demo-
cratic republic) that sought to preempt the possibility of governmental
power from abusing its citizens. This was accomplished by creating a cor-
porate model of State government: where the people were (initially land-
holding) stockholders of the “Corporation,” conducting regular elections by
the people of those representing them in government (senators, congresspe-
ople, and the President), determining the amount, nature of and limits to
their compensation, dividing government into sectors of power (legislative,
executive, and judiciary), and creating checks and balances between them
(for example, the President is commander-in-chief of the military, but its
budget is determined by Congress). The Constitution and Bill of Rights
therefore enumerated the powers granted to various segments of govern-
ment, specified limitations to each segment’s powers, and established the
means by which excessive power by one segment may be checked by the
other two.
The Constitution and Bill of Rights protect human rights by enumerat-
ing a list of duties that each segment of government has to abide by, thus
confirming the corollary nature between rights and duties, and that rights
are protected by mandating duties.
We hope that this discussion inspires more people to continue this area
of study, and to develop this discussion further.

